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Jumping the Pond: Transnational
Law and the Future of Chemical
Regulation
62 Vand. L. Rev. 1817 (2009)
Noah M. Sachs
Just as domestic pollution can cause transnational
externalities, domestic environmental regulation can create
transnational ripple effects in other jurisdictions. In this Article, I
show how chemical regulation-long a weak link in the network of
U.S. environmental laws-is about to be reshaped and reformed
through the extraterritorial ripple effects of new European Union
both international law and
legislation. Contributing to
environmental law scholarship, this Article shows how
transnational information flows can be harnessed to end the
longstanding drought of data on chemical toxicity in the United
States.
Part I of this Article critiques the U.S. chemical regulatory
regime, arguing that a lack of toxicity testing and high statutory
barriers to regulation have created a persistent data gap that has
undermined public health and environmental protections. I then
argue that the EU legislation offers a superior model for addressing
chemical risks. The EU law makes toxicity testing a default
requirement for thousands of chemicals produced or imported in
Europe, encourages substitution away from hazardous chemicals,
and shifts the burden of proof on the safety of the most hazardous
classes of chemicals from government to industry. As a result of
these innovations, this next-generation chemical regulatory regime
rewards knowledge, rather than ignorance.
In Part II of this Article, I shift to an analysis of
transnational interactions in chemical regulation. I demonstrate
the EU legislationthat "regulatory turbulence" from
effects-is already
commercial
legal,
and
political,
extraterritorial
changing the political and informational terrain for chemical
regulation in the United States. Information on chemical risks,
disclosed in Europe, will close longstanding data gaps in the United
States and will help build support for reform of U.S. law. Even if
the United States does not enact major legislative reforms, its
chemical marketplace will increasingly be governed by European

norms. Chemical regulation is therefore a case study in how
transnationallaw and global information networks are shaping the
future of American environmental law.
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INTRODUCTION

Chemical regulation is the lapdog of American environmental
law. The primary chemical regulatory statute, the Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976 ("TSCA"), 1 lacks the sharp regulatory bite of most
U.S. environmental laws. Virtually every expert panel that has
examined the U.S. system of chemical regulation has concluded that it
inadequately protects public health and the environment. 2 Yet despite
a chorus of criticism 3 and growing concern over the health effects of
chemical exposure, TSCA has been remarkably resistant to reform. It
is among the weakest, and the least amended, of all of the federal
4
environmental statutes.
1.
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92 (2006).
2.
See Wendy Wagner, Using Competition-Based Regulation to Bridge the Toxics Data
Gap, 83 IND. L.J. 629, 636 n.40 (2008) (listing expert studies that express concern over the lack of
information about adverse effects of chemicals); see also David Roe, Ready or Not: The Coming
Wave of Toxic Chemicals, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 641 n.59 (listing Government Accountability
Office reports critical of TSCA).
3.
For scholarly critiques of TSCA, see John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and
REACH: Practical Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 734-40
(2008) [hereinafter Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH]; John S. Applegate, The Perils of
UnreasonableRisk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 261, 315-30 (1991) [hereinafter Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk]; Mary L.
Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use
Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1822-25 (1989); Noah Sachs, Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal
Responses to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 313-15 (1999);
Wendy Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed
Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1663-705 (2004) [hereinafter
Wagner, Commons Ignorance];Wagner, supra note 2, at 631-37.
4.
See Oversight on the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Chemicals Management
Program at EPA- Hearing Before S. Comm. Environment & Public Works, 109th Cong. 2 (2006)
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Chemical regulation in the United States is now being
transformed, however, through the transnational effects of foreign
legislation. In 2006, the European Union ("EU") enacted ambitious
legislation called Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of
Chemicals ("REACH"). 5 REACH is the pit bull of global chemical
regulation. It accomplishes, in Europe, reforms in chemical regulation
that have long been advocated by American environmental law
scholars. 6 REACH is the first major chemical regulatory regime in the
world to shift the burden of proof on chemical safety from government
to manufacturers, and it requires safety testing for thousands of
chemicals on which there is limited or non-existent toxicity data in the
United States.7 This vast new information from Europe will enrich the
data-poor environment in which the United States has attempted to
regulate chemicals
since the mid-1970s. Europe's internal
environmental law is going global, and the implementation of REACH
in Europe now significantly increases the likelihood that chemical
regulation in the United States will be reformed.
The extraterritorial impact of REACH is just one example of a
larger trend in which the EU is increasingly setting de facto global
standards through its internal environmental legislation. The EU is
the world's largest economy, and decisions in Brussels, applicable
throughout the twenty-seven Member States of the EU, are affecting
how products are designed and manufactured from Boston to Beijing.
Since 2000, the EU has embarked on ambitious environmental
lawmaking in areas such as chemical regulation, energy efficiency,
hazardous waste, and climate change. Europe has in many cases
supplanted the United States as the leading originator and exporter of

[hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Lynn R. Goldman, Professor, Environmental Health Science,
Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of Public Health) ('TSCA is probably the EPA
statute that has seen the least change in the last 30 years.").
5.
Commission Regulation 1907/2006, 2006 O.J. (L396) 1 (EC) [hereinafter REACH].
6.
See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand
for Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1389-90 (2008) (advocating placing the burden
of proof of chemical safety on chemical manufacturers); Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal
Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of Public
Research to Private Research, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 128-35, 151-54 (arguing that TSCA's
confidential business information provisions have been abused and need reform).
7.
See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: COMPARISON OF U.S. AND
RECENTLY ENACTED EUROPEAN UNION APPROACHES TO PROTECT AGAINST THE RISK OF TOxIC

CHEMICALS 7 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07825.pdf ("TSCA does not
require companies to develop information for either new or existing chemicals, whereas REACH
generally requires companies to submit and, in some circumstances, requires companies to
develop such information for both kinds of chemicals.").
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environmental
law innovation.8
With
the United
States'
competitiveness and global influence at stake, scholars and
policymakers need to understand the mechanisms through which
European environmental law is affecting the United States and the
globe. 9
This Article demonstrates how the transnational interactions
of the EU and the United States, the two "green giants" of
environmental law,1 0 are shaping the future of chemical regulation. I
bring two distinct
literatures
into conversation:
domestic
environmental law scholarship that has focused on problems of data
generation and information management in the U.S. regulatory
process, 1 and a separate international law and political science
literature that has focused on the transnational interaction of
8.
The rise of Europe as a global standard-setter is a reversal of past trends in which U.S.
innovations in domestic environmental law influenced European law. See GIANDOMENICO
MAJONE, REGULATING EUROPE 53 (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1996) (explaining that Europe has
often benefited from the results of U.S. regulatory experiments). Examples of European imports
of U.S. innovations include environmental impact review, tradeable emissions permits, pollution
taxes, and advocacy of cost-benefit analysis in environmental law. Id.
9.
The rising European influence in global environmental affairs has been documented in
both scholarly literature and the popular media. See, e.g., MARK SCHAPIRO, EXPOSED: THE ToxIc
CHEMISTRY OF EVERYDAY PRODUCTS AND WHAT'S AT STAKE FOR AMERICAN POWER 8-10 (2007)

(describing the increasing influence of EU environmental regulation in the United States);
Ragnar E. Lofstedt & David Vogel, The Changing Characterof Regulation: A Comparison of
Europe and the United States, 21 RISK ANALYSIS: INT'L J. 399, 399-400 (2001) (listing European
regulatory methods that have been adopted by the United States); Henrik Selin & Stacy D.
VanDeveer, Raising Global Standards: Hazardous Substances and E-Waste Management in the
European Union, ENVIRONMENT, Dec. 2006, at 6, 7 (stating that the EU has become a "global
leader on hazardous substances policy"); David Wirth, The EU's New Impact on U.S.
Environmental Regulation, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer 2007, at 91, 103-04 (arguing that
EU policy is increasingly influencing U.S. environmental regulation); Tobias Buck, Standard
Bearer: How the European Union Exports Its Laws, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 2007, Analysis, at 13
(describing the increasing global adoption of EU environmental innovations and the political and
economic mechanisms through which the EU is exerting a global influence); Mark Schapiro, New
Power for 'Old Europe, NATION, Dec. 27, 2004, at 11 (discussing the significance of REACH for
the U.S. chemical industry).
10. Sheldon Kamieniecki & Michael E. Kraft, Series Foreword to GREEN GIANTS?
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, at vii (Norman J.
Vig & Michael G. Faure eds., 2004).
11. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 6, at 1377-1406 (discussing the gap between the supply
and demand of data on chemical toxicity); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the
Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 197-209 (2004) (arguing that new information
technologies will help to close data gaps and improve environmental protection); Douglas A.
Kysar & James Salzman, Foreword: Making Sense of Information for Environmental Protection,
86 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1350-61 (2008) (arguing that a central concern of environmental law is the
development of information for regulatory decision making); James Salzman, Beyond the
Smokestack: Environmental Protection in the Service Economy, 47 UCLA L. REV. 411, 480-88
(1999) (advocating a variety of informational tools for environmental protection, with a focus on
retailers as a leverage point for environmental improvement); Wagner, supra note 2, at 640-46
(advocating using competition within industries to produce information on chemical toxicity).
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domestic regulatory regimes. 2 By drawing on both sources, I show
how transnational developments in environmental law can help repair
the broken chemical regulatory regime in the United States.
This Article proceeds in two main parts. In Part I, I argue that
REACH represents a significant advance over TSCA for addressing
chemical risks to public health and the environment. TSCA has been
crippled by a data gap. It imposes stringent informational demands on
regulatory authorities to restrict or ban a chemical, yet the statute
provides few incentives for chemical manufacturers to develop the
information necessary for effective risk assessment and regulation.
Nearly thirty-five years after TSCA's enactment, we still lack detailed
toxicity data for the vast majority of the chemicals that have been
introduced into commerce in the United States. 13 We are conducting
an uncontrolled experiment on the health effects of synthetic
chemicals, with humans as the test subjects.
REACH, in contrast to TSCA, frames incentives in favor of
research and disclosure by making the provision of toxicity data a
condition of access to the €537 billion European chemical market-the
largest in the world. 14 REACH also shifts certain burdens of proof
from government to industry, makes some hazardous chemicals
subject to government authorization, and focuses systematically on
15
identifying and promoting safer substitutes for hazardous chemicals.

12.

See, e.g., DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL

REGULATORY REGIMES 43-51 (2007) (discussing global regulatory coordination); Frank Dobbin et
al., The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or
Learning?, ANN. REV. SOC. 449, 450-62 (2007) (reviewing the literature on transnational
diffusion of policies); David Lazer, Regulatory Interdependence and InternationalGovernance, 8
J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 474, 474-82 (2001) (discussing regulatory interdependence of states). For
earlier examples of this literature, see RICHARD ROSE, LESSON-DRAWING IN PUBLIC POLICY: A
GUIDE TO LEARNING ACROSS TIME AND SPACE 103-10 (1993); George Hoberg, Sleeping with an

Elephant: The American Influence on CanadianEnvironmentalRegulation, 11 J. PUB. POL'Y 107,
107-25 (1991); Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of
Domestic Politics, 32 INT'L ORG. 881, 892-93 (1978).
13. In 1994, the U.S. General Accounting Office estimated that EPA had reviewed the risks
of only 2 percent of the 62,000 "existing" chemicals that had been introduced before 1979. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: LEGISLATIVE CHANGES COULD
MAKE THE ACT MORE EFFECTIVE 3 (1994), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat2/152799.pdf.

Since 1994, additional screening-level data has been developed for approximately two thousand
High Production Volume chemicals, infra text accompanying notes 65-67, but data is still
lacking for the vast majority of chemicals.
14. The sales figures, compiled by the European Chemical Industry Council, are from 2007.
See EUROPEAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY COUNCIL, PROFILE OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY (2009),

http://www.cefic.org/factsandfigures/level02/profileindex.html.
15.

See EUROPEAN COMMISSION ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE GENERAL, REACH IN BRIEF 18

(2007) [hereinafter REACH IN BRIEF], available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/
reachpdfI2007_02_reach in brief.pdf (outlining data submission and authorization procedures of
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While REACH still faces significant implementation challenges, this
next-generation chemical regulation is likely to increase, at reasonable
cost, protections for public health and the environment relative to U.S.
law. Recent scholarship has emphasized elements of continuity
between TSCA and REACH. 16 I argue, in contrast, that REACH
represents a significant departure from the American paradigm of
chemical regulation and offers an important model for policy reform in
the United States.
Part II examines chemical regulation through the lens of
transnational regulatory theory and assesses the likely impacts of
REACH on the United States. I show how legal norms, initially
embodied in domestic legislation in one jurisdiction, can be
transplanted horizontally to other jurisdictions. This process begins
with what I call "regulatory turbulence," or extraterritorial political,
commercial, and legal effects from internal legislation. In response to
regulatory turbulence, other countries may pursue a path of
regulatory coordination with the originating jurisdiction, overtly
oppose the external influence (as in a trade conflict), or continue to
maintain divergent environmental standards.
The response of the United States to regulatory turbulence
from REACH appears to be shifting from conflict to coordination. The
United States is unlikely to adopt every component of REACH in the
coming years. But REACH-like reforms may be enacted in U.S. law as
major U.S. firms comply with REACH's requirements, industry
objections to TSCA reform become weaker, and the toxicity data
developed under REACH becomes widely available in the United
States.
This last factor-the transnational effect of information
disclosure-has not received significant attention in the literature on
transnational regulatory interactions, but it is likely to be a major
driver of reform in U.S. chemical policy. Part II fills this gap in the
literature by analyzing the transnational consequences of information
disclosure regimes. With the EU acting as a global chemical
information officer, disclosures in the EU are likely to provide needed

REACH and stating that authorization may be withdrawn if a suitable substitute becomes
available).
16. See, e.g., Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 721 (despite some
differences, "REACH follows many of TSCA's fundamental approaches to chemical regulation.");
Ortwin Renn & E. Donald Elliott, PrecautionaryRegulation of Chemicals in the U.S. and EU, in
THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE (Jonathan

B. Wiener et al. eds., forthcoming 2009) (finding similarities in the levels of precaution embodied
in the European and U.S. systems of chemical regulation).
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toxicity data in the United States. They will also alter the political
playing field on which U.S. interest groups battle for influence.
TSCA reform is not inevitable, of course. The future of TSCA
rests with the Obama Administration and with Congress, which have
many competing priorities. Yet even if TSCA is amended only
partially, or not at all, REACH could still have a beneficial impact on
the $637 billion U.S. chemical marketplace 17 by prompting firms to
reduce the use of hazardous substances, spurring global product
innovation, and empowering consumers with health and safety
information. REACH may also lead to a reevaluation of the toxic
hazards that are regulated under a wide variety of U.S. environmental
laws. One thing is clear: in examining the future of chemical
regulation, we can no longer rely on a single-jurisdiction analysis.

I. TSCA AND REACH: STRONGER CHEMICAL REGULATION
ACROSS THE POND

Chemical regulation involves collecting data on the physical
and toxicological properties of chemicals, conducting risk assessments,
and restricting chemicals deemed to pose unacceptable risks to human
health or the environment. Chemical regulation governs the "frontend" of the product life cycle, as it applies to chemicals marketed as
useful products; it can be distinguished from the variety of
environmental laws in the United States and EU regulating "backend" chemical issues, such as waste disposal or toxic emissions from
manufacturing processes. Ideally, chemical regulation should serve as
an early-warning system, alerting regulators to a chemical's risks
before it is widely dispersed through use in consumer goods or
industrial processes, or through disposal in the environment.' 8
For decades, however, chemical regulation on both sides of the
Atlantic has been plagued by a data drought: scientists and regulators
lack the risk data that would allow them to assess whether exposure
to a particular chemical, or chemicals in combination, is causing harm.
More than 82,000 synthetic chemicals have been introduced into
commerce in the United States,' 9 and we produce or import over 73
17. Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys: Chemicals (Jan. 2008), available at
homepage.smc.edu/thomas-phillip/rpt/Chemicals.pdf (2006 sales figures).
18. See S. REP. No. 94-698, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4495 ("The
most effective and efficient time to prevent unreasonable risks to public health or the
environment is prior to first manufacture. It is at this point that the costs of regulation in terms
of human suffering, jobs lost, wasted capital expenditures, and other costs are lowest.").
19. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: OPTIONS EXIST TO
IMPROVE EPA'S ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

2 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05458.pdf.
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billion pounds of chemicals per day.20 More than 100,000 chemicals
have been introduced in the EU. 2 1 Human intake of chemicals is
widespread. Recent biomonitoring studies, which analyze chemical
contaminants in human tissue samples, have confirmed that synthetic
chemicals are ubiquitous in the human body. 22 Industrial chemicals
23
have been identified in the umbilical cord blood of developing fetuses
and in human breast milk. 24 Chemicals once thought to be safely
contained in products, such as perfluorinated compounds used in
textiles, cookware, and food packaging, are now present in virtually all
people. 25 And while exposure does not equal harm, detailed toxicity
data that could connect exposure and harm has been scarce.
In both jurisdictions, toxicity data has long been unavailablenot because scientists are incapable of obtaining it, but because
existing laws provide few requirements, or even incentives, to find it.
Weak legislation has failed to counteract chemical manufacturers'
underlying economic incentive to avoid testing, 26 and after decades of
20.

See U.S. EPA, 2006 INVENTORY

UPDATE REPORTING:

DATA SUMMARY

15 (2006),

available at http:/lwww.epa.gov/iur/pubs/2006 data..summary.pdf (reporting approximately
twenty-seven trillion pounds of chemicals produced or imported in the United States in 2005).
This figure is likely an underestimate of total U.S. chemical production, because low-volume
chemical production, below 25,000 pounds per year at one site, did not need to be reported to
EPA. Id. at 1.
21. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 3.
22. In a 2003 biomonitoring study, the Environmental Working Group found that of 210
synthetic chemical substances analyzed in a population of volunteers, 167 synthetic chemicals
were present in the tissue of at least one person. JANE HOULIHAN ET AL., ENVTL. WORKING
GROUP, BODY BURDEN: THE POLLUTION IN PEOPLE 3 (2003), available at http://
archive.ewg.org/reportslbodyburdenl/pdf/BBreport-final.pdf. On average, participants in the
study had fifty-three carcinogens, fifty-eight known endocrine disrupting chemicals, fifty-three
immunotoxins, and fifty-five chemicals linked to birth defects or abnormal development in their
tissue samples. Id. For a detailed study of human exposure to chemicals, see generally NAT'L
CTR. FOR ENVTL. HEALTH, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THIRD NATIONAL REPORT
ON HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS 13-443 (2005).
23. See JANE HOULIHAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, BODY BURDEN: THE
POLLUTION IN NEWBORNS 13-15 (2005), available at http://ewg.org/reports-contentlbodyburden2/
pdf/bodyburden2_final-r2.pdf.
24. Kim Hooper & Thomas A. McDonald, The PBDEs: An Emerging Environmental
Challenge and Another Reason for Breast-Milk Monitoring Programs,108 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
387, 387 (2000).
25. RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, NOT THAT INNOCENT: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN, EUROPEAN UNION, AND UNITED STATES POLICIES ON INDUSTRIAL
CHEMICALS, at 1-3 (2007).
26. Chemical manufacturers have little incentive to conduct toxicity testing voluntarily
because toxicity data is a form of informational commons. Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra
note 3, at 1640-41. The benefits of additional toxicity information inure to society as a whole,
while the costs of toxicity testing are privately borne. See id. at 1640 n.61 (stating that toxicity
information is a public good and that providers "are not capturing the full economic benefit" of
their production). No single manufacturer has an incentive to contribute to the informational
commons because disclosure of toxicity data can lead to reductions in sales or to potential civil
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chemical regulation on both sides of the Atlantic, we are still
confronted with a persistent data drought.
This data drought is a central concern of information-andenvironment literature, a subfield of environmental law scholarship
that addresses the role of information management and disclosure in
environmental protection. Scholars such as Wendy Wagner, John
Applegate, Douglas Kysar, Jim Salzman, Rena Steinzor, and Mary
Lyndon have demonstrated that data gaps are often the result of
legislative choices and regulatory ossification, rather than the result
of any inherent inability of science to obtain the data. 27 For example,
regulators often operate in data-poor environments because of trade
secret protections, high statutory barriers to collecting data, stringent
judicial review requirements, and endless disputes over data accuracy
and quality control. 28 Accordingly, changes to the way environmental
information is gathered and managed in the regulatory process could
produce breakthroughs in understanding of toxic risks and in
protection of public health and the environment.
This Part argues that REACH offers a superior model for
developing and managing such information on toxic risks. It begins
with a critical examination of TSCA and then assesses the new
paradigm of regulation embodied in REACH.
A. TSCA's Troubles
Congress enacted TSCA in 1976 to generate "adequate data" on
the effects of chemicals and to provide "adequate authority" to EPA to
regulate chemicals that "present an unreasonable risk of injury to

liability. Id. at 1636-37. Government regulation therefore becomes necessary to overcome what
Wagner has identified as manufacturers' "strategic ignorance," their underlying incentive not to
find and disclose toxicity information. Id. at 1682, 1726.
27. See Applegate, supra note 6, at 1395-96 (advocating reducing data demand by lowering
the informational predicates for regulatory action); Esty, supra note 11, at 142 (arguing that
high transaction costs for private parties to collect environmentally-relevant information suggest
the need for regulatory agencies to fill the gaps); Kysar & Salzman, supra note 11, at 1350
(presenting a model of how information flows through regulatory institutions); Sidney A. Shapiro
& Rena Steinzor, Capture,Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1769
(2008) (supporting well-publicized informational metrics that would focus the public and
oversight authorities on an agency's core missions); Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra note 3,
at 1791 (suggesting institutional and legal reforms to cope with the toxicity data gap).
28. See Holly Doremus, Scientific and PoliticalIntegrity in EnvironmentalPolicy, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1601 (2008) (noting examples of agency misuse of scientific information); Mary L. Lyndon,
Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy: Reordering Information Privileges in
Environmental, Health, and Safety Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 465, 491-501 (2007) (trade secret
protections); infra text accompanying note 39 (statutory barriers); infra text accompanying note
45 (judicial review requirements).
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health or the environment." 29 Nearly thirty-five years later, TSCA's
promise has remained unfulfilled. In January 2009, the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO"), noting longstanding weaknesses in
chemical regulation, put the EPA toxics regulatory program on its
biannual list of "High Risk" government programs. 30 These are
programs that need "broad based transformation" and priority
attention from the new administration and Congress. 3 1
The fundamental problem with TSCA is that it both limits
information supply and creates a high regulatory demand for
information before EPA can restrict a chemical. 32 The result is
regulatory paralysis.
1. Limited Information Supply
TSCA chokes the supply of information on chemical toxicity
through several provisions. Most importantly, TSCA exempts
manufacturers of chemicals that were in commerce before 1979
(known as "existing" chemicals in TSCA parlance) from routinely
33
providing information about the toxicity of those chemicals to EPA.
This exemption has no basis in toxicology. Instead, it reflects the
lobbying strength of the chemical industry, which worked assiduously
to obtain this legislative grandfathering of all existing chemicals to
avoid the expense (and liability exposure) of testing chemicals already
on the market. 34 Congress's acquiescence in 1976 has severely
undermined the effectiveness of the statute. About 64,000 of the
82,000 chemicals (78 percent) that have been introduced in the United
States are "existing" chemicals that are grandfathered under the

29.

TSCA § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).

30.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN

UPDATE 22 (2009), availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09271.pdf.
31. Id. at 9, 21 ("Without greater attention to EPA's efforts to assess toxic chemicals, the
nation lacks assurance that human health and the environment are adequately protected.").
32. John S. Applegate & Robert L. Fischman, Missing Information: The Scientific Data Gap
in Conservation and Chemical Regulation, 83 IND. L.J. 399, 402-03 (2008).
33. See TSCA § 5(a) (pre-manufacture notices required only for new chemicals introduced
after 1979). EPA can require testing of existing chemicals on a case-by-case basis, but there are
numerous hurdles to promulgating and enforcing a test rule. See infra text accompanying notes
38-41 (describing statutory and judicial hurdles); TSCA § 4(a) (listing required agency findings
before testing).
34. The old-new distinction in TSCA provided a means of reducing political opposition from
the chemical industry by regulating new entrants and leaving existing products untouched.
Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 732.
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Act. 35 By volume, the grandfathered "existing" chemicals represent
36
about 99 percent of chemicals on the U.S. market.
The default presumption of TSCA, therefore, is that the vast
majority of chemicals can be freely marketed, even absent any toxicity
testing, unless and until EPA can prove that they pose unreasonable
risks. This presumption stands in marked contrast to the regulatory
regimes the United States has established for the introduction of
pesticides and pharmaceuticals, where the applicant has the burden of
proving safety.3 7 Moreover, by creating sharply divergent regulatory
standards for "existing" chemicals and "new" chemicals (those
introduced after 1979), TSCA retards innovation and provides
continuing incentives for use of older, untested chemicals. 38
Even under the "new" chemicals program, which is generally
seen as more stringent than the program for existing chemicals, TSCA
has failed to produce extensive data on health and environmental
risks. Under TSCA, new chemicals undergo a premanufacture notice
procedure, in which chemical manufacturers submit to EPA data
about the physical and chemical properties of the substance and
projected uses. 39 Manufacturers must disclose toxicity information
about a new chemical only if it is in the manufacturer's "possession or
control" or if it is "known to or reasonably ascertainable by" the

35. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supranote 19, at 2, 4.
36. Joel A. Tickner et al., The U.S. Experience in Promoting Sustainable Chemistry, 12
ENVTL. SCI. & POLLUTION RES. 115, 116 (2005).
37. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 735.
38. Applying new environmental standards only to new entrants is a common feature in
U.S. environmental law. Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1270 (1981). Such grandfathering provisions can
retard industry innovation and often provide a competitive advantage to existing facilities or
practices. Such grandfathering is often justified on the grounds that it would be unreasonably
costly to retrofit existing plants to conform to the latest pollution control standards, and on the
grounds that existing plants will soon cease operation, due to natural turnover in the capital
stock. These assumptions have not proven correct even in the case of major stationary sources of
emissions. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfatheringand Environmental
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1677, 1708-09
(2007) (discussing evidence that grandfathering provisions result in delayed plant retirement).
And these assumptions clearly do not hold in the context of chemical regulation. Older, "existing"
chemicals should be subject to testing because they can continue to be used for decades, they are
usually produced in the highest volumes, and they are unlikely to be phased out due to years in
use.
39. TSCA § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (2006). EPA has ninety days to object or seek more
information before the manufacture of new chemicals (or significant new uses of existing
chemicals) can commence. TSCA § 5(c). As of June 2005, EPA review of premanufacture notices
resulted in some action being taken to reduce risks of over 3,500 of the 32,000 new chemicals
that companies have submitted for review since TSCA's enactment. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: APPROACHES IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION 2 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06217r.pdf.
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submitter. 40 With this "disclose it if you have it" model, a rational firm
is incentivized not to undertake toxicity research on the products it is
41
bringing to market.
TSCA does authorize regulators to compel testing for any
chemical (existing or new), but the regulators carry a heavy burden.
EPA can order testing under Section 4 of TSCA if EPA meets a series
of regulatory hurdles in which it carries the burden of proof.42 These
hurdles in many cases place the agency in a Catch-22 by requiring a
quantitative risk assessment on a chemical before EPA can issue a
43
testing order to obtain more information about that chemical.
Finalizing a test rule can take between two and ten years, 44 and EPA's
testing orders are considered rulemakings under the Administrative
Procedure Act, subject to "substantial evidence" judicial review. 45 EPA
has neither a legislative mandate nor the staff and funding to conduct
comprehensive toxicity testing for existing chemicals. The agency has
issued formal TSCA testing orders for fewer than 200 of the 62,000
existing chemicals, 46 and these orders have frequently been delayed or
47
withdrawn after litigation.
Because of the hurdles to testing under Section 4 and the
48
weaknesses of other information disclosure provisions of TSCA,
40. 40 C.F.R. § 720.50(a)-(b) (2009).
41. Not surprisingly, only 15 percent of PMNs contain any health and safety information,
and the GAO has reported that only 20 percent of PMNs receive a detailed review by EPA.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 12. In the absence of chemical-specific test
data, EPA uses computer models and structure activity relationships ("SARs") to compare new
chemicals with chemicals of similar molecular structure on which toxicity data is available. Id. at
11.
42. Specifically, EPA can require additional testing only when the agency finds that the
chemical (1) may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment; or (2) is or
will be produced in substantial quantities, and (a) there is or may be significant or substantial
human exposure to the chemical or (b) the chemical enters or may reasonably be anticipated to
enter the environment in substantial quantities. TSCA § 4(a).
43. See Applegate, The Perils of UnreasonableRisk, supra note 3, at 319 (noting that in
practice, EPA often conducts a quantitative risk assessment on a chemical prior to issuance of a
test order); see also Daniel A. Farber, Five Regulatory Lessons from REACH 9 (Univ. Cal.
Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 1,301,306, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract -id=1301306 (arguing that TSCA embodies a "reverse precautionary
principle" because it allows "information to be gathered only when a risk is already known to
exist").
44.

GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 9.

45.

TSCA § 19(c)(1)(B).

46.

GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 4.

47. Id. at 18.
48. TSCA Section 8, for example, imposes a requirement
manufacturer, processor, or distributor of a chemical obtains
chemical poses a "substantial risk" of injury to human health
In practice, the intended early warning system of Section

to "immediately inform" EPA if a
studies or data indicating that a
or the environment. TSCA § 8(e).
8 has not promoted consistent
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chemical regulation in the United States has operated in a data-poor
environment that benefits the chemical industry but undermines
regulators' ability to understand, let alone respond to, public health
and environmental risks from chemicals. Other information disclosure
statutes-such as the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, 49 the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,50 and the Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986 51-have become
cornerstones of environmental protection in the United States. TSCA
constricts far more than it reveals.
2. Stringent Information Demands
Within this data-poor environment, TSCA imposes stringent
information demands on EPA before the agency can restrict a
chemical, and the burden of proof on chemical safety lies with the
government. EPA is authorized under TSCA Section 6 to restrict a
chemical (e.g., ban, limit certain uses, or impose labeling
requirements) only if it can show a "reasonable basis to conclude that
a chemical ... presents or will present an unreasonable risk of
.
injury to health or the environment." 52 "Unreasonable risk" is an
undefined term in the statute, but it has been interpreted to require a
complex balancing of hazard, exposure, cost, and socioeconomic data,

reporting to regulatory authorities, and it instead creates perverse incentives not to undertake
voluntary testing of chemicals. Determining whether a study suggests a "substantial risk" from a
chemical is left largely to the discretion of the manufacturer. See Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA
and REACH, supra note 3, at 736 ("Both Congress and the EPA define 'substantial risk' in a way
that leaves reporting largely to the manufacturer's own judgment."). Moreover, manufacturer
compliance with Section 8 has been sporadic. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 3 (testimony of Lynn
R. Goldman) (noting recurring problems with companies withholding data required to be
disclosed under Section 8). In the early 1990s, EPA established a self-audit program that offered
firms reduced penalties and penalty caps in exchange for implementing a compliance audit
program requiring them to submit overdue Section 8 data. More than 120 companies sent EPA
more than 11,000 studies on chemicals that had never been seen by the agency and that should
have been submitted years earlier. See Keith M. Casto & Tiffany Potter, Environmental Audits:
Barriers,Opportunities, and a Recommendation, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 233,
251 (Spring 1999).
49. Freedom of Information Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2008).
50. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47
(2000).
51. Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-05,
11021-23, 11040-50 (2000).
52. Specifically, the statute states: If the Administrator finds that there is a reasonable
basis to conclude that the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of
a chemical substance or mixture, or that any combination of such activities, presents or will
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, the Administrator shall"
restrict the chemical "to the extent necessary to protect adequately against such risk using the
least burdensome requirements[.]" TSCA § 6(a).

1830

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:6:1817

all of which must be compiled by the government. 53 Moreover, EPA
can enact restrictions on a chemical only after a full trial-type hearing;
it must make a series of statutory findings prior to restrictions; it
must choose the "least burdensome" regulatory requirement that will
adequately protect against the risk; and it must demonstrate that no
other statute could address the concern. 54 EPA chemical restrictions,
like test rules, are then subject to the searching "substantial evidence"
55
standard by a reviewing court.
Confronted with a persistent data drought, yet bearing the
burden of proof, EPA has imposed regulatory restrictions on only five
56
chemicals under Section 6 in the thirty-three year history of TSCA.
The last attempt to do so was in 1989, when EPA promulgated a rule
banning most uses of asbestos, based on ten years of hearings and a
100,000 page record. 57 That rule was set aside in Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA,58 the first and only judicial interpretation of Section
6. In that case, the Fifth Circuit faulted EPA's cost-benefit analyses,
the broad sweep of the EPA rule, and EPA's compliance with the
"least burdensome" requirement. After Corrosion Proof Fittings set
such high demands for data, scientific certainty, and proof of costeffectiveness prior to regulation, EPA never again attempted to
exercise its statutory authority under Section 6 to restrict or ban a
chemical substance.
The regulatory model of TSCA is fundamentally flawed. It is
akin to conducting a criminal prosecution without a factual
investigation, or conducting a civil trial without discovery. The
government bears the burden of proof but operates with severe
53. See TSCA § 6(c) (outlining the factors that must be considered and published in any
chemical restriction rule promulgated by EPA); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201,
1215-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting the "unreasonable risk" standard to include analysis of the
costs of any proposed restriction); Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at
756 ("The 'unreasonable' terminology in TSCA is notably unspecific, and intentionally so, but it
is clear that EPA must consider cost as well as risk in the determinations of 'unreasonable risk.'
"1).

54. TSCA § 6 (a), (c).
55. TSCA § 19(c)(1)(B).
56. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 18. The five chemicals or chemical
classes are polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), fully halogenated chlorofluoroalkanes, dioxin,
asbestos, and hexavalent chromium. Id.
57. See 40 CFR §§ 763.160-763.179 (1989) (Subpart I, prohibiting "the Manufacture,
Importation, Processing and Distribution" of various asbestos products). As the GAO has noted,
Corrosion Proof Fittings was widely considered to be a severe blow to EPA and to the
effectiveness of TSCA because "asbestos is generally regarded as one of the substances for which
EPA has the most scientific evidence or documentation of substantial adverse health effects."
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 20.
58. CorrosionProof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1229-30. For additional discussion of Corrosion
ProofFittings,see Farber, supranote 43, at 12-14.

2009]

JUMPING THE POND

1831

information deficits. John Applegate has noted that under these
conditions "agencies undertake less regulation, not because they have
made a judgment that regulatory action is unnecessary, but because
they cannot afford the high costs of developing a record that will be
9
fairly certain to withstand judicial review." 5
3. Implications of TSCA's Failures
After decades of chemical regulation in the United States,
there is still widespread ignorance and uncertainty about the actual
effects of tens of thousands of chemicals on human health and the
environment. Some chemicals that have gone untested for decades
may be completely harmless; others may be unidentified agents of
endocrine disruption, birth defects, cancer, or neurological damage.
The crucial point is that the United States lacks a sophisticated
system for obtaining the risk data that would allow regulators, firms,
and consumers to distinguish harmful (or potentially harmful)
chemicals from harmless ones.
If TSCA were more effective at generating data on chemical
risks, that data could feed other policy decisions-such as which
substances to regulate as hazardous air pollutants under the Clean
Air Act, how stringent cleanup standards should be for hazardous
waste sites, or how to set permissible chemical exposure levels for
workers under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. TSCA was
designed to be a gap-filling, cross-cutting regulatory regime that could
address risks from tens of thousands of chemicals across their life
cycles, from production to disposal. 60 Indeed, Congress intended TSCA
to complement other environmental statutes that are more focused on
controlling end-of-pipe emissions into particular media, such as air or
water. 61 Yet TSCA has never fulfilled its promise for generating the
data that might advance priority-setting and bring coherence to the
62
larger field of toxics regulation.

59. Applegate, Perils of UnreasonableRisk, supra note 3, at 266.
60. See S. REP. No. 94-698, at 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491 ("The purpose
of S. 3149 is to prevent unreasonable risks of injury to health or the environment associated with
the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of chemical substances.
The bill is designed to fill a number of regulatory gaps which currently exist.").
61. See Applegate, Perils of Unreasonable Risk, supra note 3, at 330 ("As an umbrella for
collecting, coordinating, and creating information, [TSCA] . . .has the potential to be the vehicle
for supplying data to other regulatory programs ....
").
62. See John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and HazardousPollutants, 21
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (arguing that the differences among the lists of hazardous
substances regulated under various environmental statutes are "a major underlying reason for
costliness and inefficiency in the current regulatory structure.").
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Despite these flaws, TSCA has remained remarkably resistant
to reform. Bills proposing increased mandatory testing of existing
chemicals have been rejected in Congress. 63 Some minor provisions
have been added to TSCA to address hazards from specific
chemicals, 64 but the core legal tests and the underlying structure of
American chemical regulation have not changed since the 1970s. The
chemical industry's principal trade group, the American Chemistry
Council ("ACC"), has long supported the TSCA status quo and has
65
opposed mandatory testing requirements.
Today, TSCA exists mainly as a statutory backdrop to a series
of voluntary initiatives on chemical safety, negotiated between EPA
and industry groups. 66 Many industry commitments under these
initiatives remain unfulfilled, 67 and such initiatives are not a
satisfactory substitute for an effective regulatory regime. When data
gaps emerge in voluntary testing programs run by industry, EPA
lacks the practical statutory authority to fill the gaps. 68 TSCA, it
63. In 1984, for example, the Senate rejected a TSCA amendment that would have required
toxicity testing for very high volume chemicals-those produced or imported in annual quantities
of 100 million pounds or more. See S. 3075, 98th Cong. § 4(b) (1984).
64. TSCA had minor amendments in 1986 to address asbestos in schools, in 1988 to
regulate indoor radon gas, and in 1992 to regulate hazards from lead paint. None of these
amendments altered the core provisions or incentives of TSCA. See Robert B. Haemer, Reform of
the Toxic Substances Control Act: Achieving Balance in the Regulation of Toxic Substances, 6
ENVTL. L. 99, 119-22 (1999-2000).
65. See DARYL DITZ, CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL. L., CLOUDY SKIES, CHANCE OF SUN: THE
FORECAST FOR U.S. REFORM OF CHEMICAL POLICY 1, 2 (2006), available at http://www.ciel.org/
Publications/CloudySkies_9MayO6.pdf ('The chemical industry remains satisfied with the law
as it stands.").
66. The largest of these voluntary initiatives has been the High Production Volume ("HPV")
Challenge, launched with great fanfare in 1998 as a joint project of the ACC (then known as the
Chemical Manufacturers Association), the EPA, and the Environmental Defense Fund. Under
the HPV Challenge, industry agreed to provide toxicity data on 2800 chemicals produced in
volumes exceeding one million pounds per year, and individual chemical manufacturers agreed
to "sponsor" the testing for particular chemicals. RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, HIGH
HOPES, LOW MARKS: A FINAL REPORT CARD ON THE HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICAL

CHALLENGE 3-4 (2007), available at http://www.edf.org/documents/6653_HighHopesLowMarks.
pdf.
67. Eleven years after the HPV Challenge was launched, and five years after the data sets
were due, about 280 of the HPV chemicals still remain "orphans," lacking a sponsor to pay for
their testing. See id. at 4. Moreover, manufacturers have submitted final data sets on just over
half of the chemicals that were sponsored for testing. Id. at 3. EPA committed to mandate testing
for any orphan chemicals under the HPV program, but EPA did not issue a test rule until 2006,
and that rule covered only 16 of the 280 orphan chemicals. See EPA Regulatory Actions for
Unsponsored Chemicals, http://www.epa.gov/HPV/pubs/general/regactions.htm (last visited Oct.
8, 2009). Thus, the most ambitious effort ever undertaken in the United States to assess the
toxicity of widely-used chemicals is still incomplete a decade after its inception. The
Environmental Defense Fund concluded in 2007 that the program is still
"well away from
delivering on the promises it made." DENISON, supra note 66, at 3.
68. See Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 740.
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appears, has spawned voluntary testing initiatives by necessity.6 9 Its
mandatory provisions are hollow, and reform of U.S. chemical
regulation is urgently needed.
B. Chemical Regulation Version 2.0: The Rise of REACH
With the enactment of REACH in 2006, the EU launched a
second generation of chemical regulation. The legislation is, in many
respects, the "anti-TSCA"7 0-the
transatlantic converse of the
American regulatory regime. It fundamentally reshapes the €537
billion European chemical market 71 and embodies a new paradigm in
global chemicals management in which the burden of proof on
chemical safety is shifted from government to industry for the most
hazardous classes of chemicals. REACH replaced an older package of
EU chemical legislation (comprised of more than forty directives and
regulations) that had been modeled closely on TSCA. 72 In enacting
REACH, therefore, the EU largely rejected the American approach to
chemical regulation, which had been the most influential regulatory
regime from the 1970s through the 1990s, and embarked on a new
73
path.
Like TSCA, EU chemical legislation prior to REACH focused on
testing of "new" chemicals (those introduced after 1981 in Europe),
exempted most existing chemicals from testing, and placed the burden
74
of proof on EU Member States to prove that chemicals were unsafe.
The older European legislation led to the same informational logjams
and data gaps that the United States has experienced under TSCA. Of
the 30,000 existing chemicals with annual production volumes in
Europe of over one ton, only 140 had been identified as priorities for

69. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 9 (because TSCA's testing
provisions are "burdensome and too time consuming for EPA to administer," EPA "uses
voluntary programs to help gather more data to assess risks on certain chemicals").
70. Applegate, Synthesis of TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 743.
71.

See EUROPEAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY COUNCIL, supra note 14.

72.

For an overview of the origins of chemical legislation in the European Community, see

RONALD BRICKMAN, SHEILA JASANOFF & THOMAS ILGEN, CONTROLLING CHEMICALS: THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 276 (1985). For a concise summary

of the EU chemical legislation that existed prior to REACH, see FRANK ACKERMAN & RACHEL
MASSEY, GLOBAL DEV. & ENV'T INST., TUFTS U., THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH 19-23 (2004),

available at http://www.euractiv.com/29/images/TuftsStudyonREACH-tcm29-130918.pdf.
73. For further information on European politics leading to REACH's enactment, see
Henrik Selin, Coalition Politics and Chemicals Management in a Regulatory Ambitious Europe, 7
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 63 (2007).

74. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 3; Commission White Paper on Strategy for a
Future Chemicals Policy, at 19, COM (2001) 88 final (Feb. 27, 2001) (noting the incentives for
industry to delay risk assessments under the prior EU chemicals legislation).
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testing under the prior legislation, and full risk assessments had been
prepared for only about seventy of these chemicals.7 5 Chemicals
introduced since 1981 had been subject to rigorous toxicity testing in
Europe, but they represented less than 1 percent of all the chemicals
76
marketed in Europe.
REACH was designed to break through these informational
logjams by establishing, at reasonable cost, 77 a unified, precautionary
regulation for existing and new chemicals produced or imported into
Europe. REACH improves on the American model of chemical
regulation in four major respects: it (1) increases the supply of data on
chemical toxicity, (2) decreases the informational demands on
regulatory authorities, (3) improves risk communication to the public
and to commercial users of chemicals, and (4) promotes use of
substitutes for hazardous chemicals.
1. Increased Information Supply: "No Data, No Market"
To increase the supply of information on chemical risks,
REACH ends the distinction between "existing" and "new" chemicals
and imposes on industry a default burden of data production as a
condition of manufacturing or importing chemicals into the EU. In
particular, REACH requires that all substances imported into or
manufactured in Europe in annual quantities of one ton or greater
(approximately 30,000 substances) be registered with a new European
Chemicals Agency ("ECHA") during a phase-in period that ends in
2018.78 The amount of toxicity testing that must accompany the

75. See ANDREW FASEY, LOWELL CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE PROD., REACH IS HERE: THE
POLITICS ARE OVER, NOW THE HARD WORK STARTS 3 (2008), www.chemicalspolicy.org

/downloads/REACHisHere4-2008.pdf;
Memorandum
from
the
Directorate
General
Communication of the European Commission, Q and A on the New Chemicals Policy, REACH,
MEMO/06/488 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=MEMO/O6/488&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
76. Commission White Paper, supra note 74, at 6. Of the new chemicals evaluated between
1981 and 2003, the European Commission concluded that 70 percent had one or more dangerous
properties. Commission Working Paper: Extended Impact Assessment, at 26-27, COM (2003) 644
final (Oct. 29, 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/files/reach/eiasec-2003_1171_en.pdf (discussing the knowledge gap created by the EU's earlier chemical
regulations and its effect on accurate assessment of the risks of certain chemicals).
77. The costs of REACH are addressed, infra, Part (I)(C).
78. See REACH arts. 5-7, 20. Under REACH, ECHA plays a coordination role and provides
the scientific expertise for evaluating chemicals. Actual regulatory authority, however, remains
with the European Commission and the various Member States of the EU. See Applegate,
Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 741. Joint registration is permitted when
numerous firms manufacture or import the same product. REACH art. 11. The term
"substances" includes most chemicals but excludes foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, many naturally
occurring ores and minerals, and polymers. See REACH, Exemptions From the Obligation to
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registration for each substance depends on the volume sold, with the
greatest testing and information requirements applicable to chemicals
79
produced or imported in volumes of more than 1,000 tons per year.
REACH thereby achieves in Europe a major reform in chemical
regulation that has long been advocated by American analystsputting older and newer chemicals on equal footing and requiring a
minimum toxicity data set for both.8 0 REACH also expands, relative to
U.S. practice, the number of required tests for adverse human health
and environmental effects.8 1 The registration process of REACH is the
largest effort in history to collect comprehensive toxicity data for
chemicals.
Unlike TSCA, REACH is a true market-access regulation. It is
based on the core principle of "No Data, No Market."8 2 In other words,
a company's failure to submit the required chemical registration
package, including the suite of toxicity data specified in the
legislation, results in denial of access to the €537 billion European
chemical market. The "No Data, No Market" principle is already
making toxicity testing a routine part of doing business in Europe,
rather than the exception, as it is in the United States. Firms have an
incentive to generate the toxicity data that will allow their products to
undergo registration as quickly as possible. The system rewards
knowledge, rather than ignorance.
As part of the registration process, REACH requires
submission of two distinct kinds of chemical data: hazard data and
Register in Accordance With Article 2(7)(a), Annex IV; REACH, Exemptions From the Obligation
to Register in Accordance With Article 2(7)(b), Annex V (exempting certain substances, such as
sugars, oils, amino acids, fatty acids, and "basic elemental substances for which hazards and
risks are already well known" from the registration requirement).
79. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 7 (explaining that under REACH, the tonnage of
a chemical acts as a rough surrogate for potential exposure, so the amount of required testing
escalates as the tonnage increases). Id. For the list of tests that must be conducted on substances
in the different tonnage bands, see REACH Annex VII-X.
80. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 41; Mark A. Greenwood, TSCA
Reform: Building a Program That Can Work, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10034, 10040 (2009) ("[T]he best
approach for addressing the age-old new versus existing chemical issue is to remove it from the
discussion.").
81. See GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 17, 43-47 (comparing the number
of chemical tests under TSCA and REACH). One common criticism of REACH is that at low
volume thresholds (between one and ten tons per year), REACH imposes relatively few testing
requirements. Prior EU law required notification for all new substances marketed in excess of
ten kilograms per year, so it is true that REACH has raised the tonnage threshold for new
chemical testing. See DENISON, supra note 25, at 8-10. However, the European Commission
retains the authority to require testing for low-volume substances on a case-by-case basis. See
Commission White Paper, supra note 74, at 18. For chemicals produced or imported above ten
tons per year (approximately 10,000 substances), REACH represents a significant improvement
over prior EU legislation and over TSCA.
82. REACH art. 5.
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risk data. Hazard data refers to the intrinsic characteristics of a
chemical, such as whether it is long-lived, persistent in the
environment, or carcinogenic in laboratory mice. Hazard identification
suggests a capacity to cause harm. Risk data, on the other hand,
combines laboratory findings of hazard with analysis of actual human
exposure to the compound. Risk, therefore, is the product of hazard
and exposure. Risk assessment identifies the probability of harm.
REACH requires that chemical manufacturers identify potential
exposures and submit risk assessments as a part of the registration
process, whereas in the United States risk assessments are a
governmental responsibility and are not routinely performed for
existing chemicals. Therefore, under REACH, the supply of risk
assessment data on commonly used chemicals is likely to expand
dramatically.
This shift in the burden of data production has a potential
drawback, however. Unless government regulators specifically select
chemicals for further evaluation, the principal documentation on risks
and exposures of registered chemicals will be prepared by industry. To
address the potential for abuse under this system, the ECHA and
Member States must devote adequate resources to fulfill their crucial
oversight and auditing roles.
2. Reductions in Information Demand: Authorization and Shifting
Burdens of Proof
In addition to expanding the data supply, REACH also narrows
the existing chemical data gap by adjusting the regulatory demand for
toxicity information. Recall that under TSCA, EPA bears the burden
of proof to show that a chemical poses an "unreasonable risk" to
83
human health or the environment prior to restricting a chemical.
REACH, in contrast, shifts the burden of proving the safety of certain
classes of chemicals to industry, significantly reducing the
84
informational demands on regulatory authorities.
Burden shifting is an important conceptual breakthrough in
chemical regulation. It restructures the roles of industry and
government in chemical regulation, sending a "normative message"
that "chemical risks should be controlled, eliminated, mitigated, or
83. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
84. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 4 ("REACH is based on the
principle that chemical companies have the responsibility to demonstrate that the chemicals
they place on the market, distribute, or use do not adversely affect human health or the
environment, while TSCA generally requires EPA to demonstrate that chemicals pose risks to
human health or the environment prior to controlling risks ....
").
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justified by their creators."8 5 Shifting the burden of proof on chemical
safety is a reform that has long been advocated for TSCA by American
environmental law scholars.8 6 Lynn Goldman, who oversaw TSCA
implementation in the Clinton Administration, has argued that TSCA
will "never be effective" unless it is amended to shift the burden of
87
proof on chemical safety.
Under a regulatory model that places the burden of proof for
chemical safety on industry, scientific uncertainty will be resolved in
favor of not allowing a chemical to be marketed. A governmental
burden of proof, in contrast, heightens the possibility of false negative
decisions (so-called "Type II errors") in which harmful chemicals are
freely marketed because the government cannot meet its burden of
showing harm in a context of scientific uncertainty.8 8 A well-designed
chemical regulatory regime should aim, as REACH does, to minimize
Type II errors because these errors can lead to adverse health and
environmental effects from the distribution of harmful chemicals in
commerce.
After extensive negotiations between the Council of Ministers
and the European Parliament, the EU enacted an authorization
procedure for REACH that shifts the burden of proof on safety to
industry for the most hazardous classes of chemicals: those identified
as "very high concern" ("VHC") chemicals in the registration and
evaluation stages of REACH. 8 9 These are chemicals that can cause
cancer, birth defects, or genetic mutations, as well as chemicals that
are persistent or bioaccumulative in the environment. 90 VHC
chemicals are given a "sunset date" after which they cannot be sold in
Europe without the industry proponent receiving government
authorization. 91 The concept of a default sunset date for hazardous
85. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 746.
86. Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 (testimony of Lynn R. Goldman); Sachs, supra note 3, at
348-49; see also Applegate, supra note 6, at 1389 (advocating shifting the burden of proof on
chemical safety to manufacturers a strategy to increase the supply of chemical data).
87. Hearing,supra note 4, at 2 (testimony of Lynn R. Goldman).
88. To be sure, an industry burden of proof heightens the possibility of Type I errors (false
positive decisions in which a substance may be forced off the market even if it poses little or no
actual risk). However, in balancing Type I and Type II errors, precautionary regulation should
aim to minimize Type II errors, given the potential for adverse effects on human health and the
environment. For more discussion on the balance of potential decision errors in a setting of
scientific uncertainty, see Lars Koch & Nicholas A. Ashford, Rethinking the Role of Information
in Chemicals Policy:Implications for TSCA and REACH, 14 J. CLEANER PROD. 31, 34 (2006).
89. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 12-13.
90. See REACH art. 57 (substances subject to authorization); see also REACH IN BRIEF,
supra note 15, at 16 (explaining that chemicals of very high concern include "[clarcinogenic,
mutagenic, or reprotoxic substances").
91. REACH, art. 58(1)(c).
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chemicals is itself a major achievement in the field of chemical
regulation, and the European Commission anticipates that
approximately 1,400 of the 30,000 substances (5 percent) that will be
92
registered under REACH will be subject to such authorization.
This shift in the burden of proof does not mean that all VHC
chemicals will be withdrawn from the market. Instead, regulators may
grant a time-limited authorization to continue to market a VHC
chemical if the manufacturer or importer can demonstrate that the
risks to human health and the environment are "adequately
controlled,"' 93 or if this showing cannot be made, 94 the proponent must
demonstrate: (1) that the socioeconomic benefits exceed the risks, and
95
(2) that there are no suitable substitute chemicals or technologies.
This carefully crafted text both shifts the burden of proof to
industry and brings cost-benefit analysis and product substitution into
the heart of the legislation. REACH is premised on the idea that
chemicals can simultaneously pose risks to human health and be
beneficial to human welfare in a wide variety of commercial products.
REACH therefore bifurcates regulatory action by: (1) identifying
substances of "very high concern," based on hazardous characteristics,
and imposing a presumption that VHC chemicals should not be
marketed; and (2) bringing exposure, risk, and socioeconomic concerns
into the regulatory discussion in the authorization stage, by giving
manufacturers an opportunity to overcome the presumption against
continued marketing. The legislation is an example of how
precautionary environmental legislation need not exclude cost-benefit
analysis, but instead can incorporate it into an overall regulatory
structure that still gives primacy to public health protection.

92. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 16. Industry groups have criticized REACH on the
grounds that it lacks priority-setting mechanisms, given that industry must spend substantial
resources on registration of thousands of chemicals, when only a small portion of these chemicals
will ultimately be deemed "very high concern" under REACH. See Harvey Black, Chemical
Reaction: The U.S. Response to REACH, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 125, A126 (2008). But
comprehensive identification of hazard and exposure data in the registration process, far from
being a drawback of the legislation, should be seen as an advantage. It means that risk
assessments will be based on full, rather than fragmentary, information, and that substances
will not presumptively be deemed safe without submission of the test data and exposure
information to back up that claim.
93. REACH art. 60(2).
94. REACH presumes that risks cannot be adequately controlled for persistent and
bioaccumulative chemicals and for chemicals that do not have a known safe threshold below
which a lack of adverse effects can be documented. Id. art. 60(3).
95. Id. art. 60(4).
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3. Improved Risk Communication
The third major innovation of REACH is its requirement of
bidirectional risk communication. REACH requires that chemical
manufacturers identify businesses that are downstream users of their
products-from cosmetics and candy makers to furniture makers,
farmers, and textile companies. Chemical manufacturers must
communicate to these downstream users, through a safety data sheet
accompanying chemical shipments, the known risks of each chemical
and recommended risk management techniques. 96 Downstream users,
in turn, must inform upstream suppliers of any new hazards they
discover from a chemical, as well as any indication that the risk
management instructions they received are inadequate. 97 Downstream
users must also ensure that their specific use of a chemical was
covered in the registration package submitted by the manufacturer, or
they must prepare a new chemical safety report for any unanticipated
98
uses.
REACH thereby makes data on toxicity and risk management
available up and down the supply chain, helping to overcome one of
the primary barriers to effective chemical regulation: a lack of
understanding of the actual uses and exposures to chemicals within
the chain of commerce. 99 TSCA, in contrast, does not create a
comprehensive system for tracking material flows and exposures
throughout the chain of distribution, and it imposes no responsibility
on downstream users to document how chemicals are used or how
exposures may be occurring. 100
REACH also emphasizes public disclosure and right-to-know to
a greater extent than TSCA. 101 The legislation establishes an Internet
registry of chemical data, which includes information about physical
96.

Id. arts. 31-32.

97. Id. art. 37; see also KEN GEISER & JOEL TICKNER, LOWELL CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE PROD.,
NEW DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN CHEMICALS POLICY: DRIVERS, SCOPE, AND STATUS 1, 143 (2003),

available at http://www.chemicalspolicy.org/downloads/newdirectionsfinal.pdf
("As chemical
manufacturers and importers have responsibility to assess risks, there is an incentive for them
to more effectively communicate with downstream users to obtain critical use data and for
downstream users to ensure that they obtain hazard data from manufacturers.").
98. REACH IN BRIEF, supranote 15, at 11.
99. See id. at 8 (explaining that REACH makes both chemical manufacturers and
downstream users responsible for the safe handling and use of chemicals).
100. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 37; see also Tickner, supra note 36, at

6 (explaining that chemical manufacturers often know very little about the uses of their own
chemicals more than one or two steps down the supply chain and arguing that "[i]t is virtually
impossible to manage chemicals without this knowledge").
101. For more information on the right-to-know provisions of REACH, see Applegate,
Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 750-51.
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properties and toxicity and will be accessible to both EU regulators
and the public. 10 2 It contains narrower protections for confidential
business information than TSCA. 10 3 In a critical right-to-know reform,
REACH provides that suppliers of any product in Europe that
contains a VHC chemical must alert the recipient of the product (such
as a retailer) to the presence of the chemical and provide information
on safe use. 10 4 Suppliers must also provide the same information to
consumers, upon request. 10 5 These disclosures will help spotlight, for
the first time, the presence of hazardous substances in a wide variety
of consumer products sold in Europe (and elsewhere), such as toys,
furniture, clothing, autos, and electronics.
As a package, the risk communication measures of REACH will
help promote the emerging global field of "green chemistry" 1 0 6 -an
approach to chemical manufacture and product design that minimizes
toxic risks-by making safety information broadly available to the
chemical marketplace. In the United States, firms that want to green
their supply chain are often unable to make comparative choices about
the safest chemicals for their needs because of the longstanding data
drought on chemical toxicity.107 Moreover, customers, investors,
lenders, and other stakeholders cannot judge whether a firm is
making sound choices between conventional chemicals and safer
alternatives. The information-forcing devices of REACH, such as "No
Data, No Market," and the risk communication devices of REACH will
benefit companies that reduce toxic risks from their products, in
Europe and potentially in the United States.

102. See REACH art. 77(2)(e) (mandating that information is to be made publicly available
over the Internet, except where a specific request for confidentiality is deemed justified).
103. In a 2007 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office noted persistent problems
with overbroad confidentiality claims by the chemical industry under TSCA. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 26 (noting that challenging confidentiality claims is
"resource-intensive" for EPA and that many confidentiality claims, when challenged, are found to
be inappropriate). In contrast, "REACH places substantial restrictions on the types of data that
chemical companies may claim as confidential." Id. at 27.
104. REACH art. 33. This requirement is triggered if the product contains any substance
that is subject to authorization, at greater than 0.1 percent by weight. Id.
105. Id.
106. Green chemistry refers to designing products and substances in ways that minimize
chemical risks to human health and the environment. See PAUL ANASTAS & JOHN WARNER,
GREEN CHEMISTRY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 11, 30 (1998) (defining green chemistry and outlining

its twelve principles, including designing chemical substances that have little or no toxicity and
using safer solvents and chemicals that degrade into innocuous substances).
107. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 2 (testimony of Michael P. Wilson) (explaining that in
California, businesses that use chemicals do not have sufficient data to find the least hazardous
choices).
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4. Incentives for Substitution
The fourth major innovation of REACH is that the legislation
systematically promotes substitutes for known hazardous substances
and introduces comparative analysis of the risks of chemicals into the
regulatory process. According to the preamble, REACH is designed to
"encourage and in certain cases to ensure that substances of high
concern are eventually replaced by less dangerous substances or
technologies where suitable economically and technically viable
10 8
alternatives are available."
REACH promotes substitution through both implicit incentives
and explicit requirements. Among the implicit incentives for
substitution are the public disclosure of toxicity information in the
registration process, the potential market risk from being identified as
a VHC chemical, and the administrative burden of complying with the
authorization process for VHC chemicals.
Substitution analysis is an explicit requirement of the
authorization process. Under REACH, any applicant for authorization
of a VHC chemical must include in its application an "analysis of
alternatives considering their risks and the technical and economic
feasibility of substitution."1 0 9 Where this analysis shows that suitable
alternative chemicals are available, the applicant must prepare a
formal substitution plan, including a timetable. 110 In reviewing these
applications, the European Commission can consider a variety of
factors in determining whether safer substitutes are indeed feasible,
and it must determine whether the substitutes "would result in
reduced overall risks to human health or the environment."1 1' 1 To limit
the possibility that applicants will cursorily conclude that their own
product has no viable substitute, third parties are entitled to present
11 2
information on substitutes to the Commission.
A systematic comparison of the risks of alternative chemicals
has never been a prominent part of the TSCA regulatory scheme.
Chemical substitution is mentioned only once in TSCA, in Section 6,
which requires that regulators identify substitutes along with the

108. REACH pmbl.
12; see also REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 8 (stating that one
objective of REACH is to "encourage the substitution of dangerous by less dangerous substances
where suitable alternatives are available ....The increased accountability of downstream users
and better public information will create a strong demand for substitute chemicals that have
been sufficiently tested and that are safe for the envisaged use.").
109. REACH art. 62(4)(e).
110. Id. art. 62(4)(f).
111. Id. art. 60(5)(a).
112. Id. art. 64(2).
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economic benefits of any chemical they are considering restricting. 1 3
As noted above, however, the restrictions process of Section 6 has been
invoked only five times in the history of TSCA. 1 14 Moreover, in this
regulatory context, the requirement that the government identify
whether safer substitute chemicals exist serves as one more hurdle for
regulators considering chemical restrictions. TSCA does not promote a
broader, ongoing search for safer alternatives as a routine part of U.S.
chemical policy.
C. REACH Implementationand Cost Issues
REACH's text establishes an aggressive new approach to
research, disclosure, and management of toxic risks, yet REACH's
ultimate efficacy will depend on the EU's handling of a complex set of
implementation challenges. These challenges include reviewing tens of
thousands of chemical registrations; establishing the authority and
competence of the brand-new European Chemicals Agency, which
opened its doors in June 2008; coordinating research, enforcement,
and regulatory decisionmaking across twenty-seven Member States;
evaluating thousands of chemicals for hazardous properties; and
overseeing an authorization system that is bound to lead to disputes
with manufacturers. Industry groups have charged that REACH will
lead to chemicals being withdrawn from the European market because
small enterprises will find that the burdens of testing outweigh their
profit from low-volume substances.1 1 5 They contend that supply-chain
disruptions could result and that European manufacturers who rely
on such chemicals will need to find substitutes quickly. These
implementation challenges are formidable. However, it is not unusual
on either side of the Atlantic for implementation of a regulatory
regime of this magnitude to be complex, lengthy, and subject to many
uncertainties. Effective REACH implementation needs to remain a
priority of the European Commission and the Member States.

113. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (2009) (requiring the Administrator to publish a statement
along with any rule restricting a chemical, which must include, among other things, the benefits
of the restricted chemical, the availability of substitute chemicals, and "the reasonably
ascertainable economic consequences of the rule .... ").
114. GOV'T AcCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 18.
115. Royal Society of Chemistry, REACH: The RSC Response, http://www.rsc.org/Science
AndTechnology/PolicylBulletins/IssuelJREACH.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) ("There is concern
that REACH could lead to useful chemicals being withdrawn unnecessarily due to the high cost
of testing, rather than for health, safety or environmental reasons."). But see ACKERMAN &
MASSEY, supra note 72, at 10 (arguing that if a chemical essential to downstream users is
withdrawn from the market because its manufacturer believes it is not worth paying the costs of
REACH compliance, then the chemical is probably underpriced).
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Are REACH's public health protections worth the cost?
Estimates for REACH compliance costs vary widely. The European
Commission estimated the total cost to industry for testing and
registration under REACH at C2.3 billion over the eleven-year phasein period of the legislation. 116 The Global Development and
Environment Institute at Tufts University calculated that REACH
implementation will cost the chemical industry £3.46 billion over
eleven years, or £315 million per year. 117 Industry-financed studies, on
the other hand, have calculated direct costs of up to £13 billion over
eleven years,1 18 and there is wide variation in estimates for indirect
costs, such as potential price increases for downstream users or
potential unavailability of some chemical inputs.1 1 9 As for the impact
on the United States, the American Chemistry Council has estimated
that REACH compliance will cost U.S. companies approximately $400
1 20
million over eleven years.
While these costs for industry are not insignificant, they are
also not exceptional for the launch of a major new environmental
program-a program designed to reverse three decades of inadequate,
lax regulation of the chemical marketplace. REACH compliance costs
should drop off dramatically after the initial phase-in period, when
companies will have conducted all the required testing and submitted
the registrations for chemicals now manufactured in or imported into
Europe. Moreover, annual revenues of the European chemical
industry are over £500 billion, so even if REACH compliance costs
turn out to be £1 billion per year, near the high range of estimates,
such costs would represent only 0.2 percent of annual industry
revenues. This is a small price to pay for achieving a more complete
understanding of chemical risks, reducing cancers and birth defects,
and saving-according to the estimate of the European Commission4,500 lives each year from occupational exposures to hazardous
chemicals. 121

116. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 11.
117. ACKERMAN & MASSEY, supra note 72, at 33.
118. Id. at 43.
119. For an extensive discussion of the various cost-benefit analyses prepared when REACH
was under discussion in the EU, see GEISER & TICKNER, supra note 97, at 113-18.
120. Id. at 139.
121. ACKERMAN & MASSEY, supra note 72, at 51. Only a few studies have attempted to
monetize the public health and environmental benefits of REACH. The European Commission
monetized the benefits of reduced disease and death from occupational exposures to harmful
chemicals at €50 billion over thirty years, using a figure for the value of each life saved that is
lower than figures generally used in the United States. Id. Another study by the World Wildlife
Fund-UK concluded that the benefits of REACH from reduced disease, mortality, and reduced
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II. THE TRANSNATIONAL REACH OF REACH
REACH and TSCA are two contrasting regulatory regimes,
both of which govern information generation and disclosure in a
highly globalized industry. Given that the annual chemical trade
between the United States and the EU is more than $70 billion, 122
REACH is bound to cause transnational externalities in the U.S.
market. What are these likely impacts? How will they occur? Will the
reaction to REACH in the United States be backlash and opposition,
emulation, or something else?
In this Part, I argue that the implementation of REACH in
Europe increases the probability that the United States will reform its
own system of chemical regulation by coordinating with, or emulating
the major principles of, the European model. The enactment of
REACH in 2006 may ultimately be seen as the birth of a new global
standard, with EU regulatory norms spreading to the United States
and other major jurisdictions. TSCA reform is not inevitable, however,
and the politics of chemical regulation reform in the United States are
very much in flux. Even if TSCA reform does not occur, the
transnational reach of REACH will nonetheless improve public health
protections in the United State by providing toxicity data to national
and subnational regulators and promoting beneficial changes in the
U.S. chemical marketplace.
The analysis in this Part is grounded in transnational
regulatory theory. It shows how legal norms, initially embodied in
domestic legislation in one jurisdiction, can be transplanted
horizontally to other jurisdictions. This Part explores the mechanisms
for this transmission of legal norms and argues that information
disclosure legislation such as REACH is becoming an important
vehicle for the horizontal spread of legal norms in environmental law.
A. Regulatory Turbulence
Just as one country's discharge of pollution can result in
transnational externalities, one country's regulatory response to
environmental risks can also result in transnational externalities by
imposing costs on foreign firms, limiting or expanding political options
productivity loss from chemical exposures will be €57 billion to C283 billion over twenty years.
Id. at 52.
122. See Transatlantic Business Dialogue, Trade Facts: Transatlantic Trade, http://www.
tabd.comlindex.php?option=comcontent&task--view&id=19&Itemid=48 (last visited Oct. 8,
2009) ("Imports of chemicals by the United States from the European Union rose ... to almost
$78 billion in 2007.").
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in foreign jurisdictions, changing foreign investment flows, and
shaping foreign regulatory debates.
I refer to these transnational externalities from the enactment
of internal legislation as "regulatory turbulence." Regulatory
turbulence is usually an unintended byproduct of one jurisdiction's
regulatory decisions. However, national regulators may also attempt
to enhance their own prestige and national power through intentional,
even coercive, efforts to spread their domestic innovations to other
jurisdictions. 123
Regulatory turbulence is antecedent to processes of legal
transplant or legal export that have been much analyzed in political
science literature.' 24 Transplant and export refer to the adoption by
one jurisdiction of legislative, regulatory, or judicial innovations of
another jurisdiction. 1 25 Regulatory turbulence, in contrast, occurs
before political actors have made a decision to adopt formally a foreign
legal innovation. Regulatory turbulence is best described as a "legal
irritant,"126 as it can trigger unexpected economic, political, and
cultural ripple effects in numerous jurisdictions-effects that may or
may not be reflected, ultimately, in national legislation.
Regulatory turbulence is particularly pronounced when a
jurisdiction imposes environmental standards for products traded in
global commerce, as in the case of REACH. When a large jurisdiction
enacts a product standard (such as a recycled content standard, an
energy efficiency standard, or a design or labeling standard),
multinational firms will have to meet that standard or risk losing that
market. In contrast, enactment of domestic process standards, such as
emissions limits for factories, power plants, and other sources of
123. See, e.g., David Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism as a Networked Order: The International
System as an Informational Network, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 52, 64 (2005)
("[V]ery often policy makers have an interest in the dissemination of policies, either because of
motivations around the beliefs of what is for the greater global good or because there is some
benefit to the adoption by other jurisdictions of the policy maker's innovation.").
124. See Dobbin et al., supra note 12, at 450 (reviewing and distinguishing four theories
explaining diffusion of policies across nations); David Dolowitz & David Marsh, Learning from
Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making, 13 GoVERNANCE: INT'L J.
POC'Y & ADMIN. 5, 506 (2000) (analyzing the relationship between voluntary and forced policy
transfer); Lazer, supra note 12, at 475 (highlighting three modes of regulatory interdependence
and applying them to the regulation of fish inspection); Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal
Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant
Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 839 (2003).
125. See Miller, supra note 124, at 839 (defining legal transplant as "the movement of laws
and legal institutions between states").
126. See David Levi-Faur & Jacint Jordana, Regulatory Capitalism: Policy Irritants and
Convergent Divergence, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 191, 192-93 (2005) ("[W]hen a
foreign rule is imposed .... [i]t
is not transplanted into another organism, rather it works as
fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new and unexpected events.").
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pollution, is far less likely to cause regulatory turbulence in other
jurisdictions. 127 Process standards, by their very nature, apply to
stationary facilities within the territory of the sovereign that enacts
them, whereas product standards have the potential to affect
commercial relationships, design decisions, and profitability of firms
around the world.128
REACH is a powerful engine of regulatory turbulence in the
United States and in other jurisdictions because it acts as both a
product standard, governing access to the most lucrative chemical
market in the world, and as an information disclosure statute.
Through its information generation and disclosure provisions, REACH
will create a body of toxicity data that will be accessible to any other
chemical regulatory authority in the world. REACH, therefore, is
likely to have significant extraterritorial impact on U.S. firms and
129
regulatory activity outside of Europe.
Although REACH has been in force since only June 2007, signs
of its regulatory turbulence may already be seen in the United States.
REACH is easily the biggest regulatory change for the U.S. chemical
industry in a generation-indeed, since TSCA's enactment. Most
significantly, REACH has changed the legal terrain for U.S. firms that
do business in Europe. Major U.S. chemical manufacturers such as
Dow and DuPont are now conducting toxicity testing under REACH
guidelines as part of the registration process for their products sold in
Europe. 130 In the wake of REACH's enactment, American firms are
developing EU-compliant toxicity data to avoid "toxic lock-out" for
127. EU legislation on emissions controls for cement kilns, for example, would be unlikely to
affect the cement industry outside the EU. The reach of the legislation would be limited to
cement kilns located within the political boundaries of the EU.
128. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and InternationalCompetitiveness,
102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2043-45 (1993) (distinguishing between process standards and product
standards and concluding that "the common interest in harmonizing process standards is
typically weaker than the common interest in harmonizing product standards, where
harmonization can increase the economic welfare of all nations by removing trade barriers").
129. Two-way trade (exports and imports) between the United States and the European
Union exceeded $600 billion in 2007, which was almost twice as high as U.S.-China trade and
nearly three times as high as U.S.-Japan trade. See Transatlantic Business Dialogue, Trade
Facts: Transatlantic Trade, http://www.tabd.com/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=
19&Itemid=48 (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) (noting that chemical exports from the United States to
the European Union grew by 66 percent from 2003 to 2007).
130. Dow created twenty-three research teams to gather the chemical toxicity data needed
for REACH's pre-registration deadline of December 1, 2008. Sara Goodman, New European
Disclosure Law Shifts 'Burden of Proof' to Industry, GREENWIRE, June 23, 2008,
http://www.eenews.net/gw. REACH also applies to any product that contains chemicals intended
for release during normal or foreseeable use (such as air fresheners or ink-jet printer cartridges),
REACH art. 7.1(b), so the legislation affects many large U.S. consumer product manufacturers
selling in Europe, such as Procter & Gamble and Hewlett Packard.
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their products in Europe, 131 and a cottage industry of REACH
consultants has emerged to guide American firms and their European
13 2
subsidiaries through the REACH process.
B. Three NationalResponses to Regulatory Turbulence
It is too facile to conclude that because one jurisdiction enacts
stringent domestic environmental legislation, trading partners will
inevitably follow with their own copycat legislation in a process of
upward harmonization. Regulatory turbulence may, in some cases,
lead to a transplant of regulatory innovations across jurisdictional
lines, and numerous countries may ultimately adopt a version of a
single influential regulatory model. But turbulence need not lead to
this result in all circumstances. Instead, regulatory turbulence in
environmental law can result in three distinct paths of transnational
regulatory interactions.
1. The Conflict Path
Transnational conflict is one possible response to regulatory
turbulence. State A, for example, may challenge State B's internal
environmental lawmaking as an unfair barrier to trade that
disadvantages State A's exporters. State A, the aggrieved jurisdiction,
may request diplomatic resolution, retaliate with its own trade
measures, or file a formal complaint with an international body such
as the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). Such challenges are
frequent in the case of product standards, where a trading partner
may allege that one jurisdiction's standards constitute a prohibited
non-tariff barrier to trade. In the transatlantic context, the most
prominent examples of such conflicts have been the disputes over the
European ban on beef hormones and the European moratorium on the
import and production of genetically modified foods. In both cases, the
EU's internal regulatory policy, enacted ostensibly for public health
reasons, had substantial extraterritorial effects. It served to exclude
non-compliant American products from the European market, creating

131. NINJA REINEKE, HOW IS THE US RESPONDING TO NEW EUROPEAN CHEMICALS LAW? THE
IMPACT OF EUROPE'S REACH DEBATE ON CHEMICALS POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN THE US 10 (Feb.

2008),
available
at
http://assets.panda.org/downloadsfhow-is the-us-responding-to
_the_neweuropean_chemicalsjlaw.pdf (explaining that "toxic lock out" occurs when products are
denied access to a market because of their toxic content or their non-compliance with
environmental regulations).
132. See, e.g., ChemSafe, Consulting Services for Chemical Industry, http://www.chemsafeconsulting.com/reach/consulting-firm.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
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intense trade friction and legal and political acrimony. In both cases,
133
the WTO ruled in favor of the United States.
The United States and the EU have clashed in a number of
other areas at the intersection of environmental protection and
transatlantic trade. 134 David Wirth has referred to these trade-and135
environment disputes as examples of "negative harmonization."'
These disputes are attempts to resolve the legal friction from
divergent product standards by compelling one jurisdiction to modify
136
or repeal its (usually more stringent) standard.
2. The Coordination Path
Regulatory turbulence can also stimulate a process of
coordination, in which trading partners seek to harmonize national
standards across borders. Coordination of national policies,
particularly with respect to product standards, both reduces trade
barriers and provides economies of scale, as it allows firms to produce
a single product that complies with the national requirements of
numerous jurisdictions.
Coordination of national regulatory policies may occur through
several mechanisms. It might occur through a straightforward process
of learning, modeling, and sharing of ideas. A state might adopt a
legislative program similar to one enacted by another state because
that legislation appears to be an attractive "off-the-shelf' model that
has proven workable in another jurisdiction. For example, numerous
countries now have some form of environmental impact review
legislation for major government actions, an innovation pioneered in
the United States through the National Environmental Policy Act of
133. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products, 6, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (ruling that the European
Community's measure was inconsistent with WTO law); Panel Report, European CommunitiesMeasures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 1, WT/DS291/R,
WTIDS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) (ruling that parts of the European Community's
regulatory regime for the approval and marketing of biotech products violated the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures).
134. In January 2009, for example, the United States filed a complaint with the WTO
challenging an EU ban on U.S. poultry treated with pathogen reduction chemicals. Press
Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Files WTO Case Challenging EU
Restrictions on U.S. Poultry Exports (Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/aboutus/press-office/press-releases/2009/january/us-files-wto-case-challenging-eu-restrictinsusp.
135. See Wirth, supra note 9, at 94 (finding that "structured negative harmonization" results
in "relaxation of the rigor of regulatory standards").
136. According to Wirth, the task of trade law is "to distinguish between those unilateral
measures ostensibly intended to promote environmental, consumer protection, or public health
goals that are legitimate exercises of governmental regulatory powers and those that are, by
contrast, pretexts for protectionism." Id. at 95.
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1969.137 Argentina's hazardous waste law is a virtual copy of U.S.
legislation. 138 And, as noted in Part I, the EU's chemical regulatory
regime prior to REACH was closely modeled on TSCA.
Coordination can also be stimulated through what Anne-Marie
Slaughter has called "transgovernmentalism," or the regularized
interactions of national regulatory officials operating in loose
transnational networks. 139 Within these networks, officials spread
information on best practices, highlight opportunities for welfareenhancing harmonization, and build capacity to enforce and
implement regulations. 140 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, for example, has been active since the
early 1980s in promoting voluntary harmonization of national policies
4
on chemical labeling and mutual acceptance of test data.' '
Pressure from private firms can provide yet another stimulus
for the coordination path. This mechanism of coordination, which can
unfold even without the purposive interactions of national
bureaucrats, often occurs in two steps. First, if a large jurisdiction
enacts an environmental standard for products, firms will have to
comply with that standard or risk losing access to a major customer
137. See Tseming Yang & Robert Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law 1012 (Vt. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 09-09, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1269157
(describing the
environmental impact assessment procedures adopted by various nations).
138. Miller, supra note 124, at 846.
139. Slaughter has defined "transgovernmental networks" as "pattern[s] of regular and
purposive relations among like government units working across the borders that divide
countries from one another and that demarcate the 'domestic' from the 'international' sphere."
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 14 (2004). Similarly, Kal Raustiala has defined
transgovernmental networks as "loosely-structured, peer-to-peer ties developed through frequent
interaction rather than formal negotiation." Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of InternationalLaw, 43 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1, 5 (2002). Examples of these networks include the International Organization of Securities
Commissioners, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the International
Maritime Organization, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. See
id. at 18 (explaining the "power-shift" from the state to nongovernmental organizations). For a
detailed discussion on the role of the OECD in generating transnational legal norms, see James
Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organizationfor Economic Cooperationand
Development, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 220-21 (2005).
140. See Raustiala, supra note 139, at 52-53; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government
Networks, Global Information Agencies, and DisaggregatedDemocracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041,
1057 (2003) (arguing that although transgovernmental networks rarely make binding rules, the
information-exchange function of policy networks is invaluable to domestic regulators looking for
guidance on best practices).
141. Wirth, supra note 9, at 93. Wirth notes that the OECD has had less success in
coordinating national policies on a minimum set of pre-market data for new chemicals. An OECD
effort to establish such a minimum data set in the early 1980s failed when the United States did
not accept the plan, largely because the proposal exceeded the requirements of TSCA and other
domestic legislation. Id. at 99.
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base. They may find it impractical to produce alternative versions for
other markets and may therefore choose to produce a single product
that conforms to the standards of the strictest jurisdiction. 142 In this
process, one jurisdiction's domestic law becomes the de facto global
norm governing the industry.
In the second step of coordination through pressure from
private firms, governments may conform their legislation to
approximate the law of the strict originating jurisdiction, either to
avoid trade disruption or because they find it relatively costless to do
so, since major domestic firms are already complying with the foreign
standard. 143 Firms operating in multiple jurisdictions may also lobby
for coordination of national policies at the level of the most stringent
jurisdiction to avoid being placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-Avis domestic competitors. 44 The end result of these processes is
upward pressure on national regulatory standards, outside of the
originating jurisdiction.
In this mechanism of coordination, the marketplace itself acts
as the "transmission belt" for the legal norms of the originating
jurisdiction. 145 This process has been dubbed the "California effect,"
after the U.S. state that has often played this first-mover role in
American environmental law.1 46 It has also been called a "race to the
top" or "race to the hegemon" because regulatory activity by a major
power exerts a gravitational pull on other powers to enact conforming
domestic standards. 147 For the originating jurisdiction, transforming

142. See Per-Olof Busch, Helge Jorgens & Kerstin Tews, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory
Instruments: The Making of a New InternationalEnvironmental Regime, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 146, 152 (2005) (discussing the result of economic competition as a "'race to the
top' whereby countries seek to emulate new and ambitious regulatory approaches ... and not lag
behind other countries"); see also Jacob Park, Unbundling Globalization: Agent of Policy
Convergence?, 4 INT'L STUD. REV. 230, 232 (2002) ("[I]t is frequently overlooked that it is more
expensive for MNCs [multinational corporations] to maintain different regulatory standards
than to maintain one global standard and to upgrade the environmental standards of the laggard
facilities.").
143. See Lazer, supra note 12, at 477 (noting the incentive for jurisdictions to adhere to
standards that are compatible with other jurisdictions).
144. See ELIZABETH DESOMBRE, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: INDUSTRY, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, AND U.S. POWER 5-7 (2000) (describing the

"phenomenon of internationalization of environmental policies").
145. See Yang & Percival, supra note 137, at 7 ("[R]egulatory innovations spread not only
through the work of government regulators but also through the responses of the regulated
communities.").
146. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A

GLOBAL ECONOMY 5-8 (1995); Wirth, supra note 9, at 96-97 (discussing California effect).
147. See VOGEL, supra note 146, at 6. Vogel argues that the race to the top can occur under
two conditions: (1) where domestic firms align themselves with environmental groups to push for
strict domestic environmental standards to keep out foreign competition (a so-called "Baptist-
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domestic product standards into global standards undoubtedly
benefits domestic firms, which may have made early capital
investments in compliance. 148 Indeed, a nation's ability to gain
standards is now
regional or global acquiescence to its own regulatory
149
power."
"soft
national
of
element
key
a
seen as
The EU's enactment in 2003 of a directive on electronics
provides one recent example of the coordination path. 150 That
directive, on Restriction of Hazardous Substances ("RoHS"), banned
six toxic substances from most electronics sold in Europe. 15 1 Due to the
size of the EU market, the legislation had the effect of shifting the
design and manufacture of electronic products globally. Electronics
manufacturers in China, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan quickly changed
product designs and eliminated the six toxic substances to maintain
their access to the EU market. 152 Once manufacturers shifted their
product designs to be "RoHS-compliant," other jurisdictions enacted
legislation similar to the EU model. China, for instance, adopted
legislation in 2005 (colloquially known as "China RoHS") that banned
1 53
the same six substances in most electronics sold in China.
California also adopted a version of RoHS in 2005, banning the same
six substances in covered electronics sold in California. In an example

bootlegger" coalition), and (2) where multinational corporations selling in many national markets
push for harmonized national standards to achieve economies of scale and reduce barriers to
global distribution. Id. at 7-8, 20.
148. As Kal Raustiala explained, jurisdictions actively promote adoption of their standards
abroad because they "reap the gains of convergence around their preferred outcome." Raustiala,
supra note 139, at 68.
149. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, at x

(2004) (defining soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than
coercion or payments").
150. Another example of a "California effect" in environmental regulation is the global
spread of rules mandating double hulls for oil tankers. Such rules were enacted in multiple
jurisdictions after the United States mandated double hulls for most tankers in its territorial
waters, following the Exxon Valdez oil spill. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 46 U.S.C. § 3703a(a)
(2009); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT OF

THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 1 (1998) (noting that the Oil Pollution Act, and the subsequent
adoption of a double-hull requirement in international maritime law, has led to double-hull
tankers becoming the "industry standard").
151. Directive 2002/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January
2003 on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic
Equipment, 2003 O.J. (L 37) 19.
152. See Rob Spiegel, Is Asia Ready for RoHS?, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Mar. 5, 2006, available at
http://www.edn.com/article/CA6313998.html (outlining Asia's ability to meet the EU's RoHS
directive).
153. See, e.g., Suzanne Deffree, China RoHS: Ready or Not, It's Here, ELECTRONIC NEWS,
Mar. 12, 2007, at 2; Tam Harbert, China Flexes Environmental Muscles, ELECTRONIC BUSINESS,
Sept. 1, 2006, at 34 (outlining China's regulation of lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent
chromium, polybrominated biphenyl, and polybrominated diphenyl ether).
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of how close the coordinative response can be, the California
legislation provided that if the EU added to its list of six hazardous
substances, those additional substances would automatically be
154
banned in covered electronics sold in California.
3. The Stasis Path
The third possible path of interaction among domestic
regulatory regimes is stasis. In this path, countries choose to "go their
own way," maintaining divergent environmental standards for
globally traded products, despite regulatory turbulence and probable
interjurisdictional trade disruption.
Stasis is a frequent response to regulatory turbulence for
several reasons: states may not be paying close attention to the
domestic regulatory standards of their trading partners, the
transaction costs to coordinate regulatory policy may be too high, or
states may simply decide that the environmental standards of a
foreign power would be welfare-reducing if adopted domestically.
States may also seek competitive advantage by maintaining lax
environmental standards if other jurisdictions are moving toward

stringency. 155
From a public choice perspective, even if certain bureaucratic
elites see advantages in transnational coordination of regulatory
policy (whether in the environmental field or in other policy areas
such as banking, securities, or aviation), countervailing pressures,
such as dissenting interest groups or political parties, may prevail in
the domestic political process. Various lock-in effects and path
dependency may also make it too costly to reform existing legislation
to harmonize it with the legislation of a foreign jurisdiction. The cost
of harmonizing regulatory policies across borders might range from
near-zero (if jurisdictions have no preexisting regulatory path in a
given issue area) to potentially billions of dollars (if jurisdictions have
already made significant investments in a divergent regulatory
apparatus).156

154. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25214.10(b) (West 2006); see also Noah Sachs, Planningthe
Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer Responsibility in the European Union and the United
States, 30 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 93-94 (2006) (discussing the transnational effects of the
EU's RoHS directive).
155. See Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining
Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictionsin Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
67, 88-89 (1996) (describing this inter-jurisdictional "race to the bottom").
156. Raustiala, supra note 139, at 67-68; see also DREZNER, supra note 12, at 5 ("Whether
regulatory coordination takes place is a function of the adjustment costs actors face in altering
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One prominent example of jurisdictions choosing divergent
regulatory systems for a highly globalized industry, despite regulatory
turbulence and potential trade disruption, is the continuance of
divergent cell phone standards between the United States and
Europe. The United States and the EU also maintain divergent
emissions limits and fuel economy standards for automobiles, different
standards for pesticide residues on food, and different regulatory
systems for cosmetics. Multinational firms must adapt to these
divergent standards and, in many cases, produce different products for
different markets.
4. Transnational Regulatory Interactions and Globalization
Much of the literature on transnational regulatory interactions
suggests that given the economic interdependence of globalization,
transnational convergence around certain values, policies, or outcomes
is somehow mechanistic or inevitable-especially in industrialized
nations. 157 But as the above discussion illustrates, the coordination
path is not predestined, and domestic regulatory policies frequently
diverge even among close trading partners. As nations and economies
become more interdependent, a pastiche of complex regulatory
interactions emerges, resulting in conflict, coordination, and stasis.
Despite predictions from many analysts that globalization would erode
the power of the state vis-a-vis private capital, 158 states continue to
enjoy considerable autonomy to regulate private markets within their
borders; coordination is just one possible response to regulatory
turbulence from foreign jurisdictions.
When transnational regulatory coordination does occur, it is
important to question whether such coordination is normatively
beneficial for economies, society, or the environment. Here again
generalization is difficult, and the answer must be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Regulatory coordination might lead to the rapid

their preexisting rules and regulations. When the adjustment costs are sufficiently high, not
even globalization's powerful dynamics can push states into cooperating.").
157. See Colin Bennet, What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?, 21 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
215, 216 (1991) (critiquing the argument that industrialization sets in motion "certain
deterministic processes .. .which tend over time to shape social structures, political processes,
and public policies in the same mould"); Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization and Policy
Convergence, 3 INT'L STUD. REV. 53, 53 (2001) ("An implicit assumption of most policy analysts
and some academics is that globalization leads to a convergence of traditionally national policies
governing environmental regulation, consumer health and safety, the regulation of labor, and
the ability to tax capital.").
158. See DREZNER, supra note 12, at 4 (discussing literature on the decline of the state in the
era of globalization).

1854

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:6:1817

spread of valuable innovation in environmental law, without the
laborious process of negotiating multilateral environmental treaties.
On the other hand, pressure to conform national legislation to that of
a major power might have deleterious effects. Such conformity
pressure might cut off policy innovation or experimentation, for
example, or it might lead to anticompetitive trade practices.
Given the complexities of transnational regulatory interactions,
this Article does not articulate an overarching theory, applicable
across all industries and all countries, that explains when regulatory
turbulence will lead to the conflict path rather than the coordination
or stasis paths. The outcome of transnational regulatory interactions
depends critically on the relative strength of interest groups, the cost
structures of the affected industries, the market power of the
originating jurisdiction, the closeness of political and economic ties
among jurisdictions, and a host of other factors. As one scholar
concluded, there are simply "too many important microdifferences
among industrial sectors to allow for any broad macroconclusions on
policy convergence."' 159 My conclusions in this Article are therefore
directed solely at U.S.-EU interactions on chemical policy, and not at a
much broader range of regulatory interactions in other issue areas. In
this one sector, the potential that REACH will raise global standards
for chemical testing and management should be seen as a welcome
extraterritorial benefit of the EU's regulatory decisions.
C. Information Disclosureand Regulatory Turbulence
In the Internet age, the disclosure of environmental data needs
to be seen as a new vehicle for causing regulatory turbulence in other
jurisdictions, distinct from the extraterritorial impacts of enacting
product standards. REACH is just one example of environmental
legislation with a significant information disclosure component. Other
forms of information disclosure legislation require regulated entities
to disclose product ingredients, associated health and environmental
risks, or amounts and types of pollution released from facilities.
Environmentally relevant information, once disclosed, is usually
accessible to foreign political actors, who may rely on that information
in developing new regulations or legislation, bringing enforcement
actions, or setting policy.160
159. Park, supra note 142, at 231.
160. Legislation that tightens information flows can have similar extraterritorial effects.
Gregory Shaffer has demonstrated, for example, that an EU data privacy directive enacted in
1998, which authorized the European Commission to ban data transfers from the EU to
countries that do not ensure "an adequate level of protection" for data privacy, had the effect of
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In other fields of law, these kinds of transnational,
informational ripple effects are so commonplace that we take them for
granted. Adverse corporate information disclosed under a Chinese
securities regulation can immediately affect share prices on exchanges
in New York or London. Evidence of consumer fraud unearthed in one
jurisdiction can be used to bring copycat fraud claims against the
same corporation in other jurisdictions.
Yet despite the explosive growth of information disclosure rules
as a tool for environmental protection, existing scholarship has rarely
focused on the role of information disclosure legislation as a vehicle for
the transmission of environmental law norms.
How, specifically, does information disclosure in one
jurisdiction affect the regulatory systems of other jurisdictions?
According to the political scientist David Lazer-one of the few
scholars to examine information disclosure and transnational
regulatory
interactions 16 1-nations
are
linked
through
an
"informational mode" of interdependence. 162 Lazer posits that a
jurisdiction's regulatory activity can convey informational signals to
other jurisdictions in three stages: policy deliberations, policy choices,
and policy experiences. 163 First, an originating jurisdiction may make
available the information that fed its deliberations about whether to
adopt a certain policy (e.g., scientific research used in the policy
deliberations). 16 4 Second, an originating jurisdiction conveys a
transnational, informational signal when it makes a certain policy
choice (which in itself might convince other countries to follow).' 65
Third, an originating jurisdiction conveys ongoing informational
signals about its post-enactment experience with new legislation or
regulations. 166 In this last category, the key information being
raising the stringency of data privacy protections globally. See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization
and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and InternationalRules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S.
Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 7-8 (2000).
161. See David Lazer, Global and Domestic Governance: Modes of Interdependence in
Regulatory Policymaking, 12 EUR. L.J. 455, 455-56 (2006) [hereinafter Lazer, Global and
Domestic Governance]; Lazer, supra note 123, at 52; Lazer, supra note 12, at 474 (discussing the
interdependence of different countries' regulatory policies).
162. Lazer, supra note 12, at 480-82.
163. Lazer, Global and Domestic Governance, supra note 161, at 463.
164. Lazer, supra note 12, at 481 (noting that the initial epidemiological studies on the
hazards of asbestos were conducted in Britain, and then spurred regulatory action in the United
States).
165. See id. at 480 ('To the extent that states have similar policy preferences, this
information becomes a public good, readily usable by any other states that might consider
similar regulatory policies.").
166. See id. at 475 ("The regulatory choices of other states provide signals ...to good policy
options.").
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transmitted, according to Lazer, is whether a given policy works and
achieves an adequate balance of health, environmental protection, and
cost.167 Through all three types of informational signals, Lazer
concludes, countries are constantly providing information to each
other about what desirable policies are. 168 Of course, regulatory
activity of one jurisdiction might also demonstrate to other
jurisdictions what undesirablepolicies are.
Lazer's analysis is useful in highlighting the web of
informational connections that link nations in their regulatory
policymaking, yet he overlooks some critical features of transnational
informational networks. By focusing on national sovereigns'
interpretation of policy-relevant information coming from other
jurisdictions, 169 he misses the numerous ways that information from
abroad may affect political dynamics at the subnational level: among
and
or
provincial
governments,
firms,
consumers,
state
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"). These subnational actors
may use information from foreign regulatory systems in domestic
battles for political influence. They may also rely on foreign sources of
information in developing new products, political strategies, and in
the case of state governments, regulatory agendas.
Lazer also overlooks a fourth category of informational signals
that is particularly important for understanding the REACH-TSCA
interaction: raw data on health and environmental risks, produced
after the enactment of information disclosure legislation in one
jurisdiction, may have direct transnational effects on regulation in
other jurisdictions. Information disclosure legislation in Country A, for
example, might reveal information about a risk that regulators in
Country B are required by statute to address (or might choose to
address if they have regulatory discretion). Air emissions data in an
environmental impact statement prepared in one jurisdiction might be
used by regulators who are reviewing a similar project in another
jurisdiction. In this respect, data on environmental or health risks
from one jurisdiction might "feed" ongoing regulatory processes in
other jurisdictions.
This kind of raw data is a fundamentally different type of
information than the informational signals Lazer explores, which
concern whether a certain policy, enacted abroad, is desirable.

167. Id. at 480.
168. Lazer, supra note 123, at 53.
169. See id. at 53 (conceptualizing the international system as an informational network in
which sovereign nations both produce and process information).
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Transnational flows of raw data on environmental and public health
hazards are less filtered by culture and politics than transnational
signals about what desirable policies are. And disclosures of raw data
may trigger regulatory action under existing statutes in other
jurisdictions, without a drawn-out process of considering the
desirability of foreign regulatory models. Whether environmental
disclosures in one jurisdiction can be incorporated into existing
regulation in other jurisdictions will depend on the degree of overlap
in regulatory approaches. It will also depend on the degree to which
actors abroad are monitoring environmental disclosures made in the
originating jurisdiction. 170 As Harold Koh has explained, the
horizontal spread of legal norms depends critically on whether there
are "norm entrepreneurs," such as NGOs, or "norm sponsors," such as
legislators, who are following foreign developments and are positioned
171
to use foreign sources of information in domestic political debates.
D. The Impact of REACH on the United States
With this theoretical background on transnational regulatory
interactions and informational spillover effects, it is now easier to see
the mechanisms through which REACH is influencing the United
States. REACH's transnational effects are magnified because it acts as
both a product standard and an information disclosure regulation.
Manufacturers around the globe, seeking to preserve their access to
the EU chemical market, will compile the required dossiers and
chemical safety reports on chemicals sold in the EU, most of which
have never been tested in the United States or elsewhere. Because the
hazard and risk information that will be disclosed in the EU pertains
to globally traded products, as opposed to stationary production
processes in Europe, the information is likely to be relevant to
purchasers and regulators of those same chemicals in other
jurisdictions around the globe.
What path of regulatory interaction between the United States
and the EU is likely to flow from the regulatory turbulence from
REACH: conflict, coordination, or stasis? Although REACH has only
recently been enacted, there are already signs of a shift in

170. See Lazer, Global and Domestic Governance, supra note 161, at 464-65 (noting that
policymakers can pay attention to only a small fraction of the informational signals from other
countries about policy options).
171. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing InternationalLaw Home,
35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 647-48 (1998) (providing examples of transnational norm entrepreneurs
and governmental norm sponsors).
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transnational interactions on chemical policy, from a path of U.S.-EU
conflict to one of coordination.
1. Conflict Interactions on Chemical Policy
From 2001 to 2006, while REACH was under discussion in
Europe, conflict was the dominant path of regulatory interaction
between the United States and Europe over chemical policy. Major
U.S. chemical companies and industry trade associations were
concerned about the impact of REACH on their profitability and
competitiveness. 172 And in close cooperation with American industry,
the Bush Administration launched an unusual lobbying campaign in
173
Brussels to stop or weaken REACH.
The campaign began in 2001, when the Department of
Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") advised the
American Chemistry Council "to develop an official position and
strategy as soon as possible to assist in influencing the EU's draft
text" on REACH. 174 After consultation with the ACC and major U.S.
chemical companies, the USTR, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and
the U.S. Ambassador to the EU, Boyden Gray, began lobbying EU
counterparts and Member State governments to weaken the initial
drafts of REACH.1 75 The campaign included not only traditional
diplomatic communiqu6s, but also direct lobbying of members of the
European Parliament by U.S. officials. 176 This direct lobbying was
widely decried in Europe as inappropriate interference in the EU's
internal deliberations. Portions of diplomatic communiques from the
Bush Administration to EU counterparts came from memos prepared
by the U.S. chemical industry, and U.S. environmental groups
received only token consultation. 177 In June 2004, the U.S. Mission to
the European Union presented a list of U.S. objections to REACH
172. H.R. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM-MINORITY STAFF, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., 108TH
CONG., A SPECIAL INTEREST CASE STUDY: THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION,
AND EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO REGULATE CHEMICALS 2 (COMM. PRINT 2004).

173. For more information on opposition to REACH by the United States, see id. at 2-3;
GEISER & TICKNER, supra note 97, at 137-38, and Marc Schapiro, Toxic Inaction, HARPER'S, Oct.
2, 2007, at 78, 81-82.
174. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, supra note 172, at 4.
175. See Schapiro, supra note 173, at 81-82 (detailing the reactions to REACH by various
groups in the United States).
176. See Wirth, supra note 9, at 102 & n.30 (describing October 9, 2006 email from the U.S.
Mission to the EU to members of the European Parliament containing the subject line "REACH
Second Reading: U.S. Views" and beginning "Attached is our 'voting' list on some of the
amendments you will be voting on tomorrow").
177. GEISER & TICKNER, supra note 97, at 137-38; COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, supra note 172,

at 15.
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(then still in draft form) to a WTO committee. 178 Although no formal
WTO complaint against REACH has been filed to date, several
observers of the U.S. role in REACH deliberations have concluded that
the United States succeeded in weakening key elements of REACH. 179
2. Toward a Coordination Path?
Now that REACH is in force in the EU, there are signs that
transnational interactions on chemical policy are shifting from a
conflict path to a coordination path. REACH is creating significant
regulatory turbulence in the U.S. chemical market, highlighting the
inadequacies of TSCA and expanding the scope of options that appear
politically, economically, and scientifically feasible in chemical
regulation in the United States.180 While there are other reasons for
the growing interest in TSCA reform (such as public concern over
chemicals in toys and baby products), there is little doubt that at the
state and federal level, REACH is "galvanizing attention on reforming
8
TSCA."1 1
Changes in the U.S. policy debate are occurring at numerous
levels. In the past five years, several U.S. states have enacted
legislation to address chemical hazards, an area of environmental law
traditionally under federal authority. Governors and state legislators
are looking to Europe for regulatory models. 8 2 As of December 2007,
178. U.S. MISSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, U.S. SUBMITS COMMENTS ON EC's REACH
PROPOSAL TO WTO COMMITTEE, NOTIFICATION G/TBT/N/EEC/52 REGARDING EUROPEAN

COMMISSION REGULATION COM (2003), available
ecchemical-proposals.html. Among the U.S. concerns
complex and represented an "unworkable" regulatory
terms were vague; that it would disrupt global trade;
"burdensome analytical, reporting and administrative
chemicals. Id.

at http://dublin.usembassy.gov/ireland
presented were that REACH was too
approach; that its key definitions and
and that the legislation would impose
requirements" on downstream users of

179. See, e.g., GREENPEACE, TOXIC LOBBY: HOW THE CHEMICALS INDUSTRY IS TRYING TO KILL

REACH 16-17 (2006), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international
/press/reports/toxic-lobby-how-the-chemical.pdf ("Such an international lobbying strategy, closely
coordinated with industry representatives, proved to be extremely effective especially in
watering down the draft REACH proposal, leading to a much weaker final draft in October
2003.").
180. See DITZ, supra note 65, at 2 ("The long stalemate over TSCA is beginning to shift.
Public concerns about specific chemicals are giving way to a look at systemic failures and root
causes.").
181. UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH EUR. UNION CTR. OF EXCELLENCE & UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH
GRADUATE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, A NEW EU APPROACH TO CHEMICAL SAFETY: LESSONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES? A CONFERENCE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) REGULATION PROVIDING FOR
REGISTRATION, EVALUATION, AUTHORIZATION, AND RESTRICTION OF CHEMICALS (REACH) 10

(2007), available at http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/euce/events/policyconf/O7/PDFs/ReachReport.pdf.
182. See Michael Wilson & Megan Schwarzman, California Chemicals Policy and the
European Union, Address at California-EU Regulatory Cooperation Project 3-4 (Feb. 22-23,
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eleven states had enacted restrictions on brominated flame
retardants, some of which have been found to be neurotoxins,
following a 2003 EU ban. 8 3 In September 2008, Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger of California, spurred by the enactment of REACH,
signed a landmark green chemistry law that focuses on evaluating
chemical alternatives and promoting substitution of hazardous
chemicals. 8 4 And in January 2008, the Massachusetts senate
unanimously passed "safer alternatives" legislation, designed to
encourage substitutes for ten known toxic chemicals. 8 5 The states are
clearly serving a Brandeisian role as laboratories for policy
experimentation. If a patchwork of state chemical regulation develops,
it may provide an impetus for federal chemical policy reform,
18 6
paralleling recent developments in climate change legislation.
At the federal level, the Kid-Safe Chemicals Act, l8 7 which
i8 8
amends TSCA and contains several elements inspired by REACH,
2008), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1157&context=igs
(noting that the California Green Chemistry initiative was spurred, among other things, by the
enactment of REACH and lack of federal attention to chemical policy reform); see also
Memorandum from Linda S. Adams, Cal. Sec'y for Envtl. Prot., to Chairpersons and Dirs. of the
Bds., Dep'ts, and Office 1 (Apr. 20, 2007), available at http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/Pollution
PreventionlGreenChemistryInitiativeupoadCalEPA-Green-Chemistry-Initiative-Memo.pdf
(noting that in 2007 alone, fifty bills addressing chemical safety and regulation were introduced
in the California legislature).
183. See Nat'l Caucus of Envtl. Legislators, Enacted Laws, Executive Orders & 2007
Introduced
Bills:
PBDE
Legislation
(July
13,
2007),
available at www.ncel.
netiarticles/PBDE.Legislation.Laws.Website.doc (listing the eleven states with brominated flame
retardant restrictions); Jennifer 8. Lee, Californiato Ban Chemicals Used as Flame Retardants,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, at N14 (noting that California followed the EU's lead).
184. Assem.B. 1879, 2008 Cal. Legis. Serv. 559 (West) (codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 25252-55, 25257); accord. Margot Roosevelt, California Officials Launch
Green Chemistry Initiative, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, at B1; see also S.B. 509, 2008 Ca. Legis.
Serv. 560 (West) (establishing an online clearinghouse for information on toxic chemicals in
consumer products).
185. An Act for a Healthy Massachusetts: Safer Alternatives to Toxic Chemicals, S. 2481,
2008 Leg., 185th Sess. (Mass. 2008).
186. See Daryl Ditz, The States and the World: Twin Levers for Reform of U.S. Federal Law
on Toxic Chemicals, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POLy 27, 30 (2007) ('The current upsurge of state
laws on chemicals aims not only to protect their own citizens, but also to create a political
environment for long overdue national reform."); cf. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and
Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1533 (2007)
(arguing that state-level climate change legislation is hitting a political "sweet spot" that is
creating pressure on federal legislators to adopt a climate change bill).
187. See Democrats Roll Out Broad Chemical Risk Management Reform Bill, INSIDE EPA
WKLY. REPORT, May 30, 2008, at 18; accord. Pat Phibbs, Report Lists Actions Congress Could
Take to Improve EPA Assessments under TSCA, 29 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 702 (July 18, 2005)
(quoting Sen. Lautenberg: "Europe gave us the inspiration to look hard at our own chemical law
and ways to improve it.').
188. Kid-Safe Chemicals Act of 2008, S. 3040, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 6100, 110th Cong.
(2008); S.1391, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced as the Child, Worker, and Consumer-Safe
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has been introduced in two separate Congresses, most recently in May
2008. The bill promotes alternatives to hazardous chemicals, shifts the
burden to industry to demonstrate "reasonable certainty of no harm"
from chemical products, limits confidential business information
claims, and expands biomonitoring for the presence of toxic
chemicals.18 9 While the fate of the Kid-Safe Chemicals Act is uncertain
in the 111th Congress, prominent members of Congress are
supporting the use of REACH as a model for legislative reform-they
are "norm sponsors," in the terminology of Harold Koh. These
supporters include Henry Waxman, Chair of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee, and Barbara Boxer, Chair of the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee, 190 both of whom would
have jurisdiction over a TSCA reform bill. U.S. legislators have the
advantage of observing the REACH implementation process in Europe
and learning from Europe's experience with continent-wide chemical
regulation reform.
In the small community of U.S. public interest lawyers and
activists focused on chemical policy, REACH has become a lodestar for
reform. Scientists and attorneys at groups such as the Environmental
Defense Fund, the Center for International Environmental Law,
Environmental Working Group, and the Science and Environmental
Health Network are acting as "norm entrepreneurs." These groups are
issuing detailed reports on REACH, developing a media strategy, and
providing testimony before legislative bodies to promote REACH as an
important model for the United States. The enactment of REACH has
increased NGO calls for a systematic overhaul of U.S. chemical policy,
shifting the focus from ad hoc bans or restrictions on specific
chemicals. 19 1 The activist community has been buoyed by progress at
the state level and by a series of stinging reports on federal chemical

Chemicals Act of 2005). Sen. Lautenberg has indicated he intends to introduce the Kid-Safe
Chemicals Act in the l11th Congress. Scientific Integrity and Transparency Reforms at the
Environmental Protection Agency: Hearing Before the H. Comm. and Subcomm. on Oversight,
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg), available at http://lautenberg.
senate.gov/newsroom/Hearings/060909.cfm.
189. S. 3040 § 3. The Kid-Safe Chemicals Act mandates that all existing and new chemicals
be reviewed for prioritization, that a priority list of at least 300 chemicals be developed by EPA,
and that EPA determine whether the manufacturer has met the "reasonable certainty of no
harm" test within three years of a chemical being placed on the list.
190. See H.R. 6100 (listing Waxman as a co-sponsor); Zachary Coile, EPA Was Stymied by
White House, GAO Reports, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 30, 2008, at Al (indicating Boxer's support for
chemical regulation reform).
191. See REINEKE, supra note 131, at 4 ("NGOs believe that a more comprehensive approach
is needed and would like to see some paradigm shifts similar to the ones REACH was aiming
for.").
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regulation by the GAO. 192 While activist pressure on chemical policy
has primarily been directed at the state and federal governments,
activists may also begin to target particular firms deemed recalcitrant
on issues of chemical testing and disclosure. 193 The movement for
chemical policy reform is still inchoate in the United States,1 94 but
there is no doubt that REACH has become an influential regulatory
model and has emboldened U.S. environmental activists.
In predicting whether the United States will adopt REACHlike reforms, the stance of the U.S. chemical industry is the major
wildcard. Will we see a "California effect" in chemical policy, in which
pressure from chemical manufacturers to harmonize U.S. regulation
with REACH will lead to a ratcheting up of the stringency of U.S. law?
Or will the U.S. chemical industry attempt to block TSCA reform with
the same intensity with which it attempted to weaken REACH in
Europe? In Senate testimony in February 2009, Cal Dooley, the CEO
of the American Chemistry Council, stated emphatically that "ACC is
not advocating the adoption of the European Union's REACH
system."195 Nonetheless, in a notable shift from prior positions, Dooley
also stated in the same hearing that Congress should "begin the effort
to modernize TSCA." 196 In August 2009, the ACC followed up this
statement by releasing a set of ten principles that should guide TSCA
reform. 197 The debate is now shifting from whether TSCA should be
reformed to when and how reform should occur.
There is some precedent for a "California effect" unfolding
through U.S.-EU interactions in chemical regulation. In the late
1970s, in the wake of the U.S. adoption of TSCA, European chemical
companies began to support Community-wide chemical legislation
modeled on TSCA. The European chemical industry advocated that
chemical regulation be shifted from the Member States to the
Community level to provide a counterweight to the United States and
192. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 3-6; GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 30, at 2; GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supranote 39, at 2-16.
193. See David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, Strategic Activism and Non-Market Strategy 4
(2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=897324 (noting that
activist campaigns may target manufacturers directly or may aim further "downstream," such as
by boycotting retailers that sell goods from certain manufacturers).
194. See GEISER & TICKNER, supra note 97, at 144 (noting that "the U.S. is at least several
years behind European countries in public discussions on chemicals.").
195. Revisiting the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 2
(2009) (Statement of Cal Dooley, President, Am. Chemistry Council) (emphasis in original),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090226/testimony-acc.pdf.
196. Id. at 1.
197. AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, TEN PRINCIPLES FOR MODERNIZING

TSCA (2009),

available at http://www.americanchemistry.coms-acclsecmediakits.asp?CID=2178&DID=9938.
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to ensure that enactment of TSCA did not create trade barriers with
Europe. 198 As the leading academic study of this process concluded:
"The chemical industry's desire to minimize differential treatment for
products across national lines provide[d] a powerful economic impetus
for the selection of common regulatory targets."199 Similarly, if the
regulatory differences between TSCA and REACH create duplicative
testing requirements or impediments to transatlantic trade, a
California effect could emerge in which the U.S. chemical industry
begins to support conforming changes to TSCA.
Another possibility is that as U.S. chemical companies become
accustomed to REACH compliance, their opposition to substantial
TSCA reform may soften. Defeating proposals to mandate testing and
maintaining exemptions for existing chemicals may become less
compelling legislative goals for American chemical companies as these
same companies undertake the required toxicity research for both
existing and new chemicals under REACH. And once multinational
firms have produced the required health and safety information about
their chemicals in Europe, there is little reason for them to object to
EPA disclosure requirements for the same information. Such firms
may, in fact, lobby for similar mandatory testing and disclosure rules
in the United States to level the playing field with domestic
competitors that do not do business in Europe. Gradual adjustment to
REACH by U.S. industry could provide a political opening for
significant amendments to TSCA, especially as the limits of voluntary
20 0
initiatives on chemical testing become more apparent.

198. Giandomenico Majone, Cross-National Sources of Regulatory Policy-Making in Europe
and the United States, 11 J. PUB. POL'Y 79, 98 (1991).
199. BRICKMAN, ETAL., supra note 72, at 302-03.
200. The limits of the High Production Volume Challenge program were discussed supra,
notes 66-67. The future of a second voluntary testing program for lower production volume
chemicals, called the Chemical Assessment and Management Program ("ChAMP"), is in question
due to EPA's surprise June 2009 decision to suspend risk assessments under the program.
Cheryl Hogue, EPA Suspends Part of Chemicals Program, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS,
June 19, 2009, available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/news/87/i25/8725news7.html. The ChAMP
program, launched at the end of the Bush Administration, was widely seen as an attempt by the
Administration to head off the pressure for REACH-like legislation in the United States. To
Head off REACH Effort, EPA Unveils a Series of Fixes for TSCA Rules, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP.,
Mar. 21, 2008, at 6; see also Industry Intensifies Lobbying Against REACH'Like Chemical Bills,
INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., June 20, 2008, at 4, 5. ChAMP was criticized by the NGO community,
see Press Release, Envtl. Def. Fund, ChAMP Just Doesn't Have the REACH (May 2, 2008),
available at http://www.edf.org/pressrelease.cfm?ContentID=7873, and the suspension of the
ChAMP risk assessments may indicate that EPA is reconsidering its overall approach to
chemical regulation.
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3. Information Disclosure and the Spread of European Legal
Norms on Chemical Regulation
In assessing transnational regulatory interactions in the
chemical field, it is important to look beyond questions of legislative
change in the United States. Regulatory turbulence can alter the
economic, legal, political, and informational landscape of foreign
jurisdictions, even absent any changes in national legislation-indeed,
even over the strong objections of national officials. It is in this realm
of business and consumer culture that REACH is likely to work its
most dramatic effects in the United States, at least in the near term.
Under the extraterritorial influence of REACH, the U.S. chemical
marketplace may increasingly be governed by European legal norms.
Information disclosure in Europe is the key driver of these
effects in the United States. By putting critical toxicity data in the
hands of consumers, activists, attorneys, and state regulators in the
United States, REACH will likely improve public health and
environmental protection and spark substitution of hazardous
chemicals, even without legislative changes to TSCA.
REACH will cause regulatory turbulence through four major
types of informational spillover effects in the United States. First, U.S.
chemical companies may incorporate EU toxicity testing and
information disclosure norms into their own internal practices. For
example, Dow Chemical announced in early 2008 that it will prepare
REACH-qualifying dossiers on all its products, regardless of whether
those products are actually being sold in Europe. 20 1 If other major
chemical manufacturers follow, we could see a "regulatory revolution
by surprise" 20 2 in which the EU's own internal legislation quickly
becomes the global standard followed by multinational chemical
firms.

20 3

201. UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH EUR. UNION CTR. OF EXCELLENCE & UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH

GRADUATE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 181, at 40. This may be indicative of a larger trend
toward public disclosure of potential chemical risks by U.S. firms. In March 2009, the SC
Johnson Co., manufacturer of Windex, Shout, Glade, and other household products, announced
that it would voluntarily disclose product ingredients on the Internet. Press Release, SC
Johnson, Phthalates Phasing Out and Innovative Ingredient Communication Launched (Mar. 12,
2009), available at http://www.scjohnson.com/family/fam-pre-prenews.asp?art-id=390. The
website containing the ingredient disclosures is available at http://whatsinsidescjohnson.com.
202. David Levi-Faur & Jacint Jordana, Preface: The Making of a New Regulatory Order, 598
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 8 (2005).
203. As the UC-Berkeley political scientist David Vogel has stated, in explaining the growing
influence of EU environmental standards: "Even if a country does not adopt [European]
standards, the firms that export to the EU do. And since most firms do export to the EU, they
have adopted the EU's more stringent standards." Buck, supra note 9, at 13.
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Second, REACH toxicity data will increasingly shape the
chemical purchasing decisions of U.S. manufacturers, retailers, and
consumers. REACH will likely promote the nascent green chemistry
movement in the United States by closing data gaps, allowing
comparative analysis of chemical risks, and providing a competitive
advantage to safer products. Indeed, REACH may provide a spark for
innovations in U.S. product safety that would be impossible to achieve
without plentiful background information on chemical risks. U.S.
manufacturers that purchase chemicals in bulk will now have the
capability to track REACH disclosures in Europe, which may affect
the chemical products they buy and the suppliers they choose. U.S.
manufacturers may begin to require REACH compliance (or
equivalent disclosures of toxicity data) as a condition of their
20 4
purchases from chemical suppliers in the United States.
Much of this U.S. private sector response to REACH could
become contractually obligated. For instance, representations and
warranties on REACH compliance may become standard terms in
purchase and sale contracts between U.S. and European firms. And
European chemical importers, subject to REACH registration
requirements, may contractually "push down" the testing and data
compilation requirements of REACH onto their U.S. suppliers.
The implementation of REACH will also affect U.S. retailers
and their customers. Hundreds of chemicals that will likely be subject
to authorization under REACH (because of their carcinogenicity,
adverse reproductive effects, or potential to bioaccumulate) are widely
marketed in the United States. 20 5 In response to EU decisions naming
such substances as "very high concern" chemicals, U.S. retailers may
voluntarily withdraw those same substances from the U.S. market, or
the chemicals may lose market share-a process that industry

204. See Samuel Boxerman, Christopher Bell, & Kristina Nordlander, Are You Ready for
REACH?, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Mar. 2008, at 38-39 (noting that "the initial and most visible
impact of REACH might be seen in contracts, purchase orders, and so-called 'supplier
declarations' [on compliance with REACH]").
205. In a 2008 study, which was updated in January 2009, the Environmental Defense Fund
examined 267 chemicals that it believed met the definition of "very high concern" chemicals
subject to authorization under REACH. It then examined the commercial profile of these same
chemicals in the United States. It found that at least 37 percent of these chemicals are currently
being produced or imported into the United States above 25,000 pounds annually, that at least
235 different companies are producing or importing these chemicals in the United States, and
that only about one third of these chemicals have been subject to testing under TSCA or under
voluntary programs such as the HPV Challenge. RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVTL. DEF. FUND,
ACROSS THE POND: ASSESSING REACH'S FIRST BIG IMPACT ON U.S. COMPANIES AND CHEMICALS

4-5, (2008, rev. 2009).
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insiders call chemical "deselection."20 6 Major retailers such as WalMart may order their suppliers to cease use of chemicals on the EU
authorization list,207 and consumers in the United States may avoid
products that contain chemicals subject to authorization in Europe, in
a kind of "black-list" effect. 20 8 As Ernie Rosenberg, President of the
U.S. Soap and Detergent Association, has explained, "When you
regulate a chemical product, it has a global impact in the global
information environment that we live in. An adverse finding about a
20 9
chemical anywhere creates problems for that chemical everywhere."
A third informational spillover effect from REACH is that U.S.
federal regulators can use the toxicity data from Europe in existing
regulatory regimes, including TSCA and other environmental laws.
There is clearly sufficient overlap between the chemical regulatory
regimes in the United States and the EU such that toxicity data
disclosed under REACH could, in many cases, have direct legal
relevance under TSCA. EPA could rely on data disclosed under
REACH, for instance, to support further testing requirements under
Section 4 of TSCA. 210 Under Section 11(c) of TSCA, EPA would have
the authority to subpoena documents prepared by U.S. firms in the
process of complying with REACH. 2 11 And Section 8(e) of TSCA
imposes a mandatory reporting duty when a firm obtains "information
which reasonably supports the conclusion" that a chemical "presents a

206. Ernie Rosenberg, Changes Do Not Necessarily Bring About Change, 39 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,074, 10,076 (Jan. 2009) (noting that deselection can happen quickly because
unlike formal legal controls on chemicals, purchasing decisions "are not subject to legal, political,
or scientific discipline.").
207. 2007 Outlook: REACH, New Regulations in U.S. States Suggest Volatile Year for
Manufacturers, 12 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), at B-2 (Jan. 19, 2007); accord. WAL-MART,
SUSTAINABILITY PROGRESS TO DATE 2007-2008, at 56, available at http://walmartstores.com/sites/
sustainabilityreport/2007/documents/SustainabilityProgressToDate2007-2008.pdf.
208. See MICHAEL WALLS, REACH 101: UNDERSTANDING AND PREPARING FOR THE NEW EU
CHEMICALS

LEGISLATION

638

(2008),

available

at

http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/

datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/CN044 chapter_-27 thumb.pdf (noting the "black-list" effect of being
placed on the candidate list for authorization). Consumers may become aware of the chemical
constituents of products sold in the United States through the disclosure requirements of
REACH Article 33, which mandates disclosure and safe handling instructions for any articles
sold in Europe that contain substances of very high concern. While REACH primarily applies to
raw chemical inputs, rather than to finished consumer products, Article 33 is a notable
exception. It will, for the first time, require disclosures of many hazardous product ingredients.
209. Stefan Baumgarten, Regulatory Bubble, ICIS CHEMICAL BuS., Jan. 21, 2008, at 14.
210. See TSCA § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) and discussion supra notes 30, 52-59 and
accompanying text, for further explanation of TSCA testing and information requirements.
211. TSCA § 11(c). EPA would have to be willing to use its existing subpoena power to
obtain these documents. But see Greenwood, supra note 80, at 10,039 (noting that EPA has
"virtually ignored" its Section 11 subpoena power to date).
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substantial risk of injury to health or the environment." 21 2 The United
States is a party to OECD agreements on mutual recognition of
chemical testing data and would likely be able to use EU data in
TSCA decisionmaking. 213 REACH chemical toxicity and risk
assessment data might also be used by federal agencies to make
regulatory decisions under other environmental and public health
laws, such as establishing cleanup standards for hazardous waste
sites, establishing standards for food packaging or cosmetics, or
addressing emerging regulatory issues around nanotechnology.
Finally, information disclosure under REACH is likely to have
significant impacts on subnational environmental regulation in the
United States. As states consider bans or restrictions on certain
classes of chemicals, the toxicity data from Europe-as well as EU
decisions on which chemicals are of "very high concern"-is likely to be
influential. 2 14 Additionally, chemical toxicity data disclosed under
REACH could be used by plaintiffs' attorneys in the United States as
the basis for tort suits over occupational or other chemical exposures.
These suits have traditionally been very difficult to bring because of
problems in proving causation, long latency periods, and a lack of
basic toxicity data on commonly used chemicals. 215 The REACH data
that will be generated in Europe over the next decade represents a
wealth of information on chemical toxicity that has long been absent
216
from American courtrooms.

212. TSCA § 8(e); see also discussion of EPA's prior implementation of Section 8, supra note
48.
213. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Decision
Concerning the Mutual Acceptance of Data in the Assessment of Chemicals, OECD Doc. C(81)30
(May 12, 1981), as amended by OECD, OECD Doc. C(97)186 (Nov. 26, 1997), available at http://
OECD, Decision-Recommendation
webdominol.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/C(81)30;
on Compliance with Principlesof Good LaboratoryPractice,OECD Doc. C(89)87 (Oct. 2, 1989), as
amended by OECD, OECD Doc. C(95)8 (Mar. 9, 1995), available at http://webdominol.oecd.
org/horizontalloecdacts.nsf/linkto/C(89)87.
214. See MICHAEL P. WILSON ET AL., GREEN CHEMISTRY IN CALIFORNIA, A FRAMEWORK FOR
LEADERSHIP IN CHEMICALS POLICY AND INNOVATION 63 (2006), available at http://coeh.

berkeley.edu/docs/news/06_wilson-policy.pdf (arguing that REACH represents an opportunity for
California "to gather information on the physical attributes and basic toxicological properties of
many chemicals in commercial circulation" in the state).
215. See Sachs, supra note 3, at 326-41 (outlining hurdles to bringing tort suits over
chemical exposures).
216. See Black, supra note 92, at A127 (stating that "information provided by REACH should
begin to help overcome the difficulty in linking specific health problems with exposures to
specific chemicals or mixtures of chemicals"); MARSH INC., REACH: NEW EU REGULATION FOR
THE CHEMICALS INDUSTRY 3 (2007), available at http://global.marsh.com/documents/
Internationalbriefings/REACHInternational_Bulletin.pdf (noting that information generated for
REACH compliance could be used in litigation in non-EU jurisdictions).
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It is clear that information disclosure under REACH will have
a number of regulatory and non-regulatory ripple effects in the United
States. These effects from foreign legislation suggest that scholars in
the information-and-environment field need to look beyond U.S.
borders. American environmental law scholars have frequently
focused on how to amend TSCA to require, or incentivize, more
extensive toxicity testing for chemicals. 2 17 But it now appears that
REACH will become the principal source of this much-needed increase
in the supply of chemical toxicity information in the United States,
and globally. If chemical toxicity data is an informational commons, as
Wendy Wagner has suggested, 218 then it is a global commons,
unconstrained by jurisdictional fences. New scholarship in the
information-and-environment field must consider how these global
information flows can be harnessed to improve U.S. environmental
regulation.
CONCLUSION

Chemical regulation is a case study in the politics of
transnational regulatory interactions and information flows in the era
of globalization. The international system is no longer characterized
by sharp dividing lines between domestic and international law.
Instead, innovations in domestic environmental law can become the
springboard for transnational changes in regulatory policy. Similarly,
transnational legal developments can shape domestic regulatory
environments.
That EU legislation is now setting the terms of debate over
chemical policy in the United States is a remarkable departure from
past trends, in which the United States was the principal source of
transnational regulatory innovation in environmental law. In
chemical regulation, there is little doubt that policy currents from the
EU are blowing westward across the Atlantic, putting the United
States in the unfamiliar position of reacting to developments in the
EU's internal environmental law.
As this Article has shown, while TSCA reform is by no means
inevitable, the implementation of REACH does make reform more
likely. New reform coalitions will emerge, toxicity data will become
217. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 2, at 631 (arguing that existing incentives not to
undertake toxicity testing could be reversed if manufacturers could petition EPA to have their
products certified as superior from the standpoint of safety); Applegate, Perils of Unreasonable
Risk, supra note 3, at 328-29 (advocating replacement of the "substantial evidence" standard for
judicial review of TSCA test orders with an "arbitrary and capricious" standard).
218. See Wagner, Commons Ignorance,supra note 3, at 1622-25.

2009]

JUMPING THE POND

1869

available from the EU, and longstanding industry arguments that
TSCA is adequately protective of human health and the environment
will be undermined by the more stringent regulatory regime across
the Atlantic.
Can the United States simply free ride on the data from
Europe? Globalization and modern communications technology
certainly create the possibility that a single large jurisdiction, such as
the EU, could become what Anne-Marie Slaughter has called a "global
information agency," 219 coordinating research, testing, and disclosure
of risk data that other jurisdictions could then rely upon for their own
environmental regulation.
But there is reason to be skeptical that the broken chemical
regulatory regime in the United States could be fixed solely through
such free riding, without substantial reform to TSCA. TSCA suffers
both from limited data supply and from stringent informational
demands prior to regulation. REACH data from Europe will help close
the supply side of the data gap in the United States, with the many
positive effects discussed above. But as long as TSCA maintains its
complex procedural requirements, its governmental burden of proof,
and its high hurdles to restrict a chemical under Section 6, a gap will
persist between information supply and information needs.
A comprehensive fix of chemical regulation in the United
States will require piercing the armor that has protected TSCA from
significant amendment for more than three decades. The United
States should aspire to be a leader in chemical safety and product
sustainability, and TSCA reform is essential to that task. The main
principles of REACH-such as "No Data, No Market"; ending
distinctions between new and existing chemicals; substitution for
hazardous chemicals; and increased public disclosure of risk
information-point the way toward the next generation of chemical
regulation in the United States.

219. SLAUGHTER, supra note 139, at 156-65.

